OFAC Burma sanctions

The Burma sanctions program is administered by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). It targets persons and entities connected to the Myanmar military regime, particularly following the February 1, 2021 coup d'état in which the Tatmadaw deposed the elected civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy.

The current program was reactivated and expanded under Executive Order 14014 ("Blocking Property With Respect to the Situation in Burma"), signed by President Biden on February 11, 2021. EO 14014 authorizes blocking property of persons determined to be responsible for or complicit in undermining democratic processes in Burma, committing serious human rights abuses, or being military or security-force officials. Sanctioned parties are added to OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List.

Key designations have included senior Tatmadaw leadership such as Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and Deputy Commander Soe Win, members of the State Administration Council, and military-linked conglomerates Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC). Treasury has also targeted arms brokers, the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) — designated in October 2023 — and entities supplying jet fuel used in airstrikes against civilians.

The program operates alongside parallel measures, including Commerce Department export controls under the Export Administration Regulations and State Department restrictions. OFAC issues General Licenses authorizing limited categories of transactions (such as official U.S. government business, certain NGO activity, and wind-downs), and publishes FAQs interpreting prohibitions.

Historically, comprehensive U.S. sanctions on Burma existed from 1997 (EO 13047 under Clinton) through expansions in 2003 and 2007, before being substantially eased between 2012 and 2016 as the country transitioned toward civilian rule, and terminated by EO 13742 in October 2016. The post-coup framework is narrower and more targeted, focusing on regime actors and revenue streams rather than imposing a broad trade embargo.