Influence operations

Influence operations (IO) refer to organized activities designed to affect how target audiences think, decide, or act, typically in service of a sponsor's strategic objectives. They blend communication, psychology, intelligence tradecraft, and increasingly digital tools. Unlike conventional diplomacy or public affairs, influence operations often rely on concealment of the sponsor, manipulation of information environments, or amplification of divisive narratives.

The concept sits within a broader family of doctrines including psychological operations (PSYOP), political warfare, active measures (the Soviet/Russian tradition), and what Chinese strategists have called the "three warfares" (public opinion, psychological, and legal). Western militaries often distinguish IO from strategic communications: the former may be covert and adversarial, the latter overt and attributable.

Typical techniques include:

• Inauthentic social media networks that impersonate locals or journalists.
• Front media outlets that launder state narratives through seemingly independent voices.
• Forgeries and fabricated documents seeded into legitimate news ecosystems.
• Co-opted influencers, academics, or politicians ("witting" or "unwitting" agents).
• Hack-and-leak operations that pair cyber intrusion with selective disclosure.

High-profile cases have shaped contemporary understanding. The U.S. Intelligence Community Assessment of January 2017 attributed an influence campaign targeting the 2016 U.S. presidential election to Russian actors, including the Internet Research Agency. Meta, Twitter, and Google have since published periodic takedown reports identifying networks linked to Russia, Iran, China, and other states. The EU's East StratCom Task Force, established in 2015, tracks pro-Kremlin disinformation through its EUvsDisinfo project.

Legally, influence operations occupy a gray zone: they rarely cross the threshold of an "armed attack" under UN Charter Article 51, but may violate principles of non-intervention articulated in cases such as Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ, 1986). NATO's 2016 Warsaw Summit recognized hybrid threats, including IO, as triggers for collective response. Defensive responses include media literacy programs, platform content policies, sanctions, and transparency requirements such as the EU's 2022 Digital Services Act.