The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific was adopted in September 2021, building on April 2021 Council Conclusions. It marked the European Union's first comprehensive policy framework for a region stretching from the east coast of Africa to the Pacific Island states, reflecting growing recognition that the Indo-Pacific's economic, demographic, and strategic weight directly affects European prosperity and security.
The strategy identifies seven priority areas: sustainable and inclusive prosperity; green transition; ocean governance; digital governance and partnerships; connectivity; security and defence; and human security. It is explicitly framed as cooperative and inclusive rather than confrontational, and the EU has avoided characterising it as anti-China — though concerns about coercive economic practices, maritime tensions in the South and East China Seas, and Taiwan Strait stability are clearly visible between the lines.
Operationally, the strategy is delivered through instruments including the Global Gateway connectivity initiative (launched December 2021, with a stated €300 billion mobilisation target through 2027), enhanced trade agreements (e.g. with Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, and ongoing negotiations with Australia, India, and Indonesia), and security tools such as the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept extended to the Northwest Indian Ocean in 2022. The EU has also pursued digital partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.
Several member states maintain their own national Indo-Pacific guidelines that predate or complement the EU framework — notably France (2018, updated 2021), Germany (2020), and the Netherlands (2020). France, as a resident power with territories including New Caledonia and Réunion and roughly 1.6 million citizens in the region, is the most active military contributor.
Critics argue the strategy is under-resourced relative to US, Chinese, or Japanese initiatives, lacks a clear stance on Taiwan, and that EU institutional fragmentation limits delivery. Supporters note it gives Brussels a coherent voice in a region where it had long been treated primarily as a trading bloc. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine diverted attention but also reinforced arguments that European security and Indo-Pacific stability are linked.
Example
In February 2022, the French EU Council presidency hosted the inaugural Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in Paris, bringing together some 60 foreign ministers to operationalise the September 2021 strategy.
Frequently asked questions
Officially no. The text describes engagement as 'multifaceted' and pursues cooperation with China where possible while pushing back against unfair practices. In practice, concerns about Chinese coercion shape much of its substance.
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