The hub-and-spokes model describes an asymmetric network in which a dominant actor (the hub) anchors a set of bilateral relationships with smaller partners (the spokes), while the spokes themselves remain only loosely connected. The term is most often applied to the post-1951 U.S. alliance system in East Asia, sometimes called the San Francisco System, in which Washington signed separate defense treaties with Japan (1951, revised 1960), the Philippines (1951), South Korea (1953), Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS, 1951), and Thailand (via the Manila Pact, 1954), rather than building a NATO-style multilateral pact.
Scholars including Victor Cha have argued that the United States chose bilateralism partly to exercise tighter control over potentially revisionist allies — a "powerplay" rationale — and partly because divergent threat perceptions and historical animosities among Asian states made a collective arrangement politically unworkable. The contrast with NATO's integrated command in Europe is central to the concept.
Beyond security, analysts use hub and spokes to describe:
- Trade architecture: a large economy signing overlapping bilateral free trade agreements (e.g., the United States or the EU with smaller partners), which can disadvantage spoke economies that lack FTAs with each other — a dynamic Richard Baldwin highlighted in his work on the "spaghetti bowl" effect.
- Logistics and aviation: the original commercial usage, where carriers route traffic through a central hub airport.
- Financial and regulatory networks, including correspondent banking.
Critics note that hub-and-spokes structures concentrate bargaining power in the hub and can fragment the periphery. Recent Indo-Pacific diplomacy — including the Quad, AUKUS (2021), and trilateral cooperation such as the Camp David summit between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea (August 2023) — is often framed as a partial shift from pure hub-and-spokes toward a more "networked" or "latticework" architecture, though the underlying bilateral treaties remain in force.
Example
In August 2023, the Camp David summit between U.S. President Biden, Japanese PM Kishida, and South Korean President Yoon was widely described as an effort to move beyond the traditional hub-and-spokes alliance model toward trilateral cooperation.
Frequently asked questions
Common explanations include divergent threat perceptions among Asian partners, lingering historical animosities (especially toward Japan), and a U.S. preference for tighter bilateral control over allies — what Victor Cha calls the 'powerplay' rationale.
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