For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt.Skip to main content
A core peacekeeping principle requiring that the main parties to a conflict agree to the deployment and mandate of a UN operation on their territory.
Consent of parties is one of the three foundational principles of United Nations peacekeeping, alongside impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The principle holds that a peacekeeping operation can only be deployed with the agreement of the main parties to the conflict — at minimum the host state, and in most cases the principal armed factions. Without this consent, a mission loses its political legitimacy, freedom of movement, and the cooperation needed to carry out tasks such as monitoring ceasefires, disarmament, or protection of civilians.
The principle traces back to the establishment of the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956 during the Suez Crisis, when Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Canadian diplomat Lester B. Pearson argued that a UN force could only operate on Egyptian soil with Cairo's express consent. The doctrine was later codified in the Capstone Doctrine (formally United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines), published by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 2008.
Consent matters legally and operationally:
Consent is rarely absolute. At the tactical level, spoilers, militias, or local commanders may withhold cooperation even when national authorities agree. The Capstone Doctrine acknowledges that robust peacekeeping mandates — such as MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade authorized by Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013) — may use force against specific armed groups without eroding the principle, provided the host state still consents to the mission's overall presence.
The mission typically must withdraw or be reconfigured. Recent examples include MINUSMA's termination in Mali (2023) and earlier the wind-down of UNMEE between Ethiopia and Eritrea (2008).
Even most Chapter VII peacekeeping operations still rely on host-state consent in practice. True enforcement actions, which do not require consent, are rare and distinct from peacekeeping.
At a minimum the host government, and ideally the main belligerents named in a peace agreement. Tactical-level actors like local militias often do not give formal consent, which complicates implementation.