The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) is the apex integrity institution of the Union government, charged with superintending the vigilance and anti-corruption machinery of central government departments, public sector undertakings, and other Union organisations. It was first constituted by an executive resolution of the Government of India dated 11 February 1964 on the recommendation of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption (1962–64). Originally a non-statutory advisory body, the CVC acquired statutory status following the Supreme Court's directions in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) — the Jain Hawala case — which led to the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003. The Act converted the single-member Commission into a multi-member body and conferred binding superintendence over the Delhi Special Police Establishment (CBI) insofar as it investigates offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Under Section 3 of the CVC Act, the Commission consists of a Central Vigilance Commissioner as chairperson and not more than two Vigilance Commissioners. They are appointed by the President on the recommendation of a high-powered committee comprising the Prime Minister (chair), the Union Home Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha — a composition that parallels the appointment of the CBI Director and the Lokpal members. Each holds office for four years or until age 65, whichever is earlier, and can be removed only by the President in a manner analogous to a UPSC member, on grounds of proven misbehaviour or incapacity following a Supreme Court inquiry, securing their independence. The Commission's functions include exercising superintendence over the CBI in PC Act matters, tendering advice to central authorities on vigilance cases, and supervising the Chief Vigilance Officers (CVOs) posted in ministries and PSUs. Since the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 and the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Informers (PIDPI) Resolution, 2004, the CVC is the designated agency to receive and act on whistle-blower complaints.
A landmark instance shaping CVC jurisprudence is Centre for PIL v. Union of India (2011), the P.J. Thomas case, in which the Supreme Court quashed Thomas's appointment as CVC because the high-powered committee failed to consider a pending chargesheet against him, establishing that institutional integrity must inform such appointments. The CVC also chairs the selection committee for the Director of Enforcement and plays a role in CBI Director selection. It submits an annual report to the President, laid before Parliament, and is purely advisory regarding disciplinary action — it cannot itself prosecute. As of 2026 the Commission continues to operate from Satarkata Bhawan, New Delhi, and observes Vigilance Awareness Week each year around 31 October.
For UPSC, the CVC features prominently in GS Paper II under "statutory, regulatory and quasi-judicial bodies" and governance reforms. Typical question angles compare the CVC with the Lokpal, CBI, and CAG; trace its evolution from executive resolution to statute via Vineet Narain; or test the appointment committee composition and the P.J. Thomas ratio. Candidates should distinguish its advisory character from the Lokpal's investigative and prosecutorial powers under the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013.
Example
In 2011, the Supreme Court in the P.J. Thomas case quashed Thomas's appointment as Central Vigilance Commissioner, holding that the high-powered committee had ignored a pending corruption chargesheet against him.
Frequently asked questions
The CVC was originally created by a government resolution in 1964. It gained statutory status through the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, enacted after the Supreme Court's directions in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998).