AUKUS Pillar 2

AUKUS is a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced on 15 September 2021. It is organised around two workstreams. Pillar 1 concerns helping Australia acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. Pillar 2 is the broader and more open-ended track focused on co-developing and fielding advanced military capabilities.

According to joint statements from the three governments, Pillar 2 work covers areas including:

• Undersea capabilities (autonomous underwater vehicles)
• Quantum technologies (positioning, navigation, timing)
• Artificial intelligence and autonomy
• Advanced cyber capabilities
• Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic systems
• Electronic warfare
• Innovation and information sharing

Unlike Pillar 1, Pillar 2 does not involve transferring nuclear propulsion technology, which makes it legally and politically easier to expand to additional partners. Since 2023 the three governments have publicly discussed potential cooperation with like-minded states on specific Pillar 2 projects. In April 2024, the AUKUS defence ministers announced they were "considering cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects," and similar exploratory conversations have been reported regarding Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea on a project-by-project basis. Any such involvement would be limited rather than full membership.

Pillar 2 progress has been constrained by US export-control rules, particularly the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The US National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 created licence exemptions for Australia and the UK intended to streamline technology transfers among the three partners, with implementing regulations issued by the US State Department in 2024.

For MUN and policy researchers, Pillar 2 is significant because it reframes AUKUS from a narrow submarine deal into a wider technology bloc, raising questions about export controls, alliance interoperability, regional reactions (notably from China, Indonesia, and Malaysia), and the future architecture of Indo-Pacific security cooperation.