AOIP (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific)

The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) was adopted by ASEAN leaders at the 34th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in June 2019. It represents the bloc's consensus response to competing Indo-Pacific strategies advanced by the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, as well as China's Belt and Road Initiative.

The AOIP is not a security doctrine in the traditional sense. Instead, it is a normative framework built on several core principles:

• ASEAN centrality as the guiding force in the evolving regional architecture
• Inclusivity rather than containment, explicitly avoiding the framing of the region as an arena of major-power rivalry
• A rules-based order anchored in international law, including UNCLOS
• Dialogue and cooperation instead of bloc-based competition
• Use of existing ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) as platforms for implementation

The Outlook identifies four priority areas of cooperation: maritime cooperation, connectivity, UN Sustainable Development Goals (2030 Agenda), and economic and other possible areas of cooperation.

Geographically, the AOIP treats the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions as a "closely integrated and interconnected" space rather than as contiguous but separate theaters — a subtle but important framing choice that distinguishes it from the US "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) concept, which more explicitly centers strategic competition with China.

The AOIP has been progressively referenced in joint statements between ASEAN and dialogue partners. The EU, Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, and the United States have all issued joint cooperation statements aligning their respective Indo-Pacific approaches with the AOIP's four priority areas. Critics argue the document is deliberately vague and lacks implementation mechanisms; supporters counter that its ambiguity is precisely what allows ASEAN to preserve unity and maneuvering room among ten member states with divergent threat perceptions toward China.