Anti-defection

The anti-defection law in India is contained in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, inserted by the Fifty-second Amendment Act, 1985 during Rajiv Gandhi's premiership to curb the "Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram" culture of floor-crossing that destabilised legislatures through the 1960s and 1970s. It empowers the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (and their counterparts in State legislatures) to disqualify a member on two principal grounds: if the member voluntarily gives up membership of the party on whose ticket he was elected, or if the member votes or abstains contrary to the direction (whip) issued by the party without obtaining prior permission and without the act being condoned within fifteen days. The Supreme Court in Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994) clarified that "voluntarily giving up membership" is wider than formal resignation and can be inferred from conduct.

The Schedule originally permitted a "split" by one-third of a party's members and a "merger" by two-thirds, but the Ninety-first Amendment Act, 2003 deleted the one-third split exception, leaving only the two-thirds merger as a valid defence. The same amendment barred a disqualified member from holding any remunerative political office and capped the Council of Ministers at 15 percent of the legislature's strength. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Schedule's validity but struck down Paragraph 7, which had barred judicial review, holding that the Speaker acts as a tribunal whose decisions are subject to review on grounds of mala fides, perversity, or violation of natural justice — though courts ordinarily intervene only after the Speaker decides.

The law's chief weakness, repeatedly flagged, is the absence of a time limit on the Speaker's decision, enabling partisan delay. In Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur (2020), the Court recommended that Speakers decide within three months and suggested Parliament consider transferring the adjudicatory power to an independent tribunal headed by a retired judge. Recent instances — the 2019 Karnataka rebellion that toppled the Kumaraswamy government (adjudicated in Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker, Karnataka, 2019, where the Court held that resignation and disqualification operate independently), the 2020 Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan crises, and the 2022 Maharashtra split in the Shiv Sena — kept the law's interpretive gaps central to current affairs. As of 2026 the Maharashtra disqualification proceedings and the larger question of party-symbol allocation by the Election Commission remained contentious.

For the examination, anti-defection is core to Indian Polity and Governance (UPSC GS Paper II; CSS Constitutional Law; BCS Bangladesh Affairs by analogy). Candidates must name the Tenth Schedule, the 52nd and 91st Amendments, and the Kihoto Hollohan and Kihoto ratio on judicial review. Typical prelims questions test the grounds of disqualification and the adjudicating authority; mains questions ask whether the Speaker's role compromises neutrality and whether reform — fixed timelines or an independent tribunal — is desirable, demanding citation of the 170th Law Commission Report and the Keisham Meghachandra directions.