Spain: History, Government & Society

Spain is a pro-EU, NATO-aligned parliamentary monarchy whose foreign policy is shaped less by grand-strategy revisionism than by coalition management at home, EU bargaining in Brussels, and instability on its southern flank. It is a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy, with King Felipe VI as head of state and Pedro Sánchez as prime minister; Sánchez was reappointed after the November 2023 investiture vote and leads a PSOE-led minority coalition government with Sumar, backed in parliament by several regional parties La Moncloa Congress of Deputies PSOE Sumar.

Spain’s foreign-policy center of gravity is firmly Western, but its value to allies comes from geography and institutional weight rather than military scale alone. Spain is a member of the European Union, NATO, the United Nations and the G20 European Union NATO United Nations G20. It hosts key NATO assets at Rota and Morón that matter for Atlantic and Mediterranean operations, and the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid reinforced Spain’s role as a reliable alliance platform even as its defense spending remained below the alliance’s 2 percent benchmark NATO NATO. Madrid’s diplomacy prioritizes EU cohesion, support for Ukraine, management of migration routes from North and West Africa, and stability in the Mediterranean, while trying to avoid the sharper anti-China language favored by some northern and eastern EU states Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs POLITICO.

Economically, Spain is a large diversified eurozone economy with services at its core, especially tourism, transport, finance, construction, and advanced manufacturing. The World Bank put Spain’s GDP at about $1.62 trillion in current US dollars in 2023, and Eurostat reported population at roughly 48 million in January 2024 World Bank Eurostat. Tourism remains a major external earner: Spain recorded a historic 94 million international visitors in 2024, according to official tourism data, reinforcing growth but also deepening dependence on consumption, seasonal labor, housing pressure, and transport infrastructure INE. Spain has also become one of Europe’s stronger performers on renewable energy deployment, with wind, solar, interconnections, and green-industry policy now central to both its economic model and its EU positioning Red Eléctrica European Commission.

Three issues define Spain’s current trajectory. First is governability: Sánchez remains in office, but his coalition depends on fragmented parliamentary support and recurrent bargaining with Catalan and Basque parties, which makes domestic concessions and amnesty-related politics directly relevant to Spain’s diplomatic bandwidth and credibility abroad Congress of Deputies Reuters. Second is the migration-security nexus across the Mediterranean and Atlantic routes, where Spain combines tougher border management with pragmatic cooperation with Morocco and other origin and transit states because irregular arrivals are both a domestic political vulnerability and a standing EU negotiating issue European Council Spanish Ministry of the Interior. Third is strategic positioning inside Europe: Spain wants more EU industrial policy, fiscal flexibility, and energy-market reform, and it has pushed to frame energy interconnection and green investment as continental security issues rather than just national economic demands Council of the European Union European Commission.

The near-term read is that Spain will stay anchored in the EU-NATO mainstream while sounding more selective than hawkish on China, more southern-focused than eastern-focused on security, and more ambitious on climate and industrial policy than on hard-power expansion. Its main vulnerability is not strategic drift but political fragmentation: if regional election setbacks continue to weaken the governing bloc ahead of the next general election, Madrid’s external posture will remain broadly predictable, but its room to take costly or controversial initiatives will narrow POLITICO El País.

Modern Spanish policy still turns on two historical lessons: avoid domestic rupture and lock Spain into Europe. The first came from the collapse of the liberal monarchy, the Second Republic, and the Civil War of 1936–39, which ended with Francisco Franco’s dictatorship and left a durable elite consensus that polarization can become existential if institutions fail Encyclopaedia Britannica, Spanish Civil War Britannica, Francisco Franco. The second came from Spain’s long isolation under Franco after 1945, when the regime was initially excluded from the postwar European order even though Cold War dynamics later brought U.S. base agreements in 1953 and UN membership in 1955 U.S. Office of the Historian, The United States and Spain, 1945–1953 United Nations, Spain. Current governments across the center-left and center-right still treat European and Atlantic integration as the antidote to the instability and marginalization associated with that earlier period Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The decisive founding moment for present-day Spain was the transition after Franco’s death in 1975. King Juan Carlos I and Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez managed a negotiated democratization that produced the 1978 Constitution, establishing Spain as a parliamentary monarchy, recognizing autonomous communities, and embedding compromise as a governing norm Official Gazette of the State, Spanish Constitution of 1978 Britannica, Adolfo Suárez. That transition remains politically central because it created both the state structure and the legitimacy narrative that still frame major disputes: the monarchy’s role, the balance between Madrid and the regions, and the idea that democratic actors should bargain rather than break the system. The failed 23 February 1981 coup attempt reinforced that anti-rupture instinct and strengthened the norm that the armed forces are subordinate to constitutional rule Britannica, 23-F.

Spain’s next major inflection point was external reintegration. Joining NATO in 1982 and the European Communities in 1986 anchored Spain in Western institutions, expanded its economic model, and reoriented foreign policy away from exceptionalism toward coalition politics inside Brussels and the Atlantic alliance NATO, Spain and NATO European Union, Spain. This is the historical root of Spain’s current preference for influence through the EU, support for multilateral rules, and selective Atlanticism rather than unilateral hard-power posture. Even when Madrid diverges from allies, as in the Iraq War crisis of 2003–04, the argument is usually framed as defending international legality and domestic democratic consent, not rejecting alliance membership itself Britannica, Spain.

Two later histories shape domestic and foreign policy more directly today. One is terrorism: decades of ETA violence, ending only after ETA’s 2011 declaration of the definitive cessation of armed activity and its 2018 dissolution, left the Spanish state highly sensitive to sovereignty, internal security, and the political management of separatism Council on Foreign Relations, ETA, Terrorism, and Spain BBC, Basque separatist group ETA disbands. The other is the Catalan crisis, especially the 2017 unconstitutional independence referendum and ensuing confrontation, which hardened Madrid’s red line against unilateral secession and made constitutional order a foreign-policy issue whenever outsiders comment on Spain’s territorial integrity Spanish Constitutional Court via BOE referendum rulings archive European Parliament, Catalonia: constitutional and political debate. Contemporary leaders therefore invoke two linked narratives: Spain as a success story of democratic reconciliation after dictatorship, and Spain as a plural but indivisible constitutional state whose stability depends on negotiation inside European and legal frameworks rather than rupture outside them Government of Spain, La Moncloa Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Spain is a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy in which executive authority flows from the Cortes Generales and the prime minister, while the king serves as head of state with largely arbitral and ceremonial constitutional functions under the 1978 Constitution Spanish Constitution of 1978. The Cortes is bicameral, made up of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate, and the prime minister is invested by the Congress rather than directly elected Congress of Deputies, La Moncloa - The President of the Government. Felipe VI remains king, and Pedro Sánchez remains president of the government after securing investiture in November 2023 following the July 2023 general election, in which the conservative People’s Party won the most seats but failed to assemble a governing majority Royal Household of Spain, Spanish Congress of Deputies - Investiture Session, Spain Ministry of the Interior - 2023 General Election Results.

Governance is shaped less by the crown than by parliamentary arithmetic and Spain’s highly fragmented party system. Sánchez governs through a left-wing minority coalition led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party and Sumar, backed in key votes by Basque, Catalan, and other regional parties whose support was decisive for investiture La Moncloa - Government Composition, Spanish Congress of Deputies - Parliamentary Groups. That support came at a political price: the government’s survival depends on continuous bargaining over budgets, territorial issues, and implementation of agreements with nationalist parties, which has made routine lawmaking slower and more transactional than in past majority governments Elcano Royal Institute, European Parliament - 2023 Spanish Elections Briefing. The recent electoral cycle has reinforced that pressure rather than eased it, with the 2023 national vote producing no clear governing bloc and subsequent regional contests exposing vulnerabilities for the governing left ahead of the next scheduled general election Spain Ministry of the Interior - 2023 General Election Results, POLITICO.

Judicial independence in Spain is formally protected by the constitution, but the system has faced persistent rule-of-law criticism over the politicization of judicial appointments, especially the long-running deadlock over renewal of the General Council of the Judiciary, the governing body of judges Spanish Constitution of 1978, European Commission 2024 Rule of Law Report: Spain. The European Commission has repeatedly urged Spain to renew the council as a priority and to adapt the method for selecting its judicial members to European standards by reducing direct political influence European Commission 2024 Rule of Law Report: Spain. In June 2024, the governing PSOE and opposition PP reached an agreement to renew the council after years of institutional blockage, but Brussels still tied progress to deeper reform of the appointment model rather than simple replacement of expired members Council of Europe - GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round Compliance Report Spain, Reuters.

Current reform debates center on two linked questions: territorial accommodation and institutional trust. The Sánchez government has defended controversial measures including the 2024 amnesty law for people tied to the Catalan independence process as a tool to stabilize relations with Catalan parties and preserve governability in Madrid, while critics in the opposition, parts of the judiciary, and civil society argue that the measure strained equality before the law and institutional credibility La Moncloa, Reuters, European Commission 2024 Rule of Law Report: Spain. Spain remains a consolidated democracy with competitive elections, strong administrative capacity, and deep integration into EU legal and political frameworks, but its governance model is now defined by coalition fragility, regional veto players, and a judiciary whose formal independence is stronger than public confidence in its insulation from party conflict Freedom House - Spain, European Commission 2024 Rule of Law Report: Spain.

Spain is a services-heavy euro-area economy with a large industrial base but limited commodity endowment. Services generated 76.4% of gross value added in 2023, industry 20.5%, construction 5.4%, and agriculture 2.5%, according to the national statistics office; tourism remains a major external earner, with Spain receiving 93.8 million international visitors in 2024, a record level INE INE - Tourist Movements at Borders. Manufacturing is concentrated in autos, chemicals, food processing, pharmaceuticals, machinery, and refined petroleum products, while the country is structurally dependent on imported energy and raw materials rather than commodity exports ICEX Spain Trade and Investment World Bank Data - Spain. That mix gives Madrid a clear policy preference for open trade, stable energy imports, and EU single-market rules that protect cross-border services and industrial supply chains European Commission - 2024 European Semester Country Report Spain.

The trade map is overwhelmingly European. In 2024, 62.7% of Spain’s goods exports went to the EU and 50.1% of its goods imports came from the EU; France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the United States were among its largest individual trading partners, with Portugal especially important because of dense Iberian energy and industrial integration Ministry of Economy, Trade and Enterprise - Monthly Foreign Trade Report Observatory of Economic Complexity - Spain. Spain also runs a structurally important services surplus, led by travel, which helps offset deficits in goods and energy trade Banco de España - Annual Report 2024 IMF Article IV Consultation: Spain. For foreign policy, that means Spain is usually more sensitive than some northern EU partners to shocks that hit tourism demand, shipping, or imported fuel prices, and more cautious about trade fragmentation with China or broader disruptions in global demand European Commission - Country Report Spain 2024 POLITICO.

Currency policy is outsourced to the European Central Bank because Spain uses the euro, so Madrid cannot devalue or set national interest rates. That constrains crisis management but lowers transaction costs with its main trading partners and reduces exchange-rate risk inside the euro area, which absorbs most Spanish trade European Central Bank - The euro Ministry of Economy, Trade and Enterprise - Foreign Trade. The fiscal picture has improved from pandemic peaks but remains tight by northern European standards: Spain’s general government deficit fell to 3.2% of GDP in 2024, while gross public debt stood at 101.8% of GDP at end-2024 Banco de España - Annual Report 2024 Eurostat - Government deficit/surplus, debt and associated data. EU fiscal surveillance therefore matters directly to Spanish policy, and so do NextGenerationEU funds, which the European Commission identifies as central to investment in digitalization, rail, energy grids, and industrial upgrading European Commission - Spain Recovery and Resilience Plan.

Two economic features shape Spain’s external choices more than headline GDP does. The first is strength: Spain has become one of Europe’s best-positioned economies on renewable power and LNG regasification capacity, giving it a stronger energy-security cushion than many EU peers after the 2022 gas shock and reinforcing its push for better interconnection with France and deeper EU energy integration IEA - Spain 2024 Energy Policy Review Enagás. The second is vulnerability: high structural unemployment, especially among youth, and still-elevated public debt make the government politically sensitive to growth slowdowns and borrowing costs; the unemployment rate was 11.4% in the first quarter of 2026, still among the highest in the EU INE - Economically Active Population Survey Eurostat - Unemployment statistics. That combination usually pushes Spain toward pragmatic EU economic diplomacy: pro-single market, pro-fiscal flexibility when growth weakens, supportive of industrial policy and energy transition spending, and generally wary of external confrontations that would raise import costs or depress services exports IMF Article IV Consultation: Spain European Commission - Country Report Spain 2024.

Spain’s security posture is alliance-first, expeditionary, and fiscally tighter than most front-line NATO states. Spain’s armed forces had about 117,400 active personnel in 2024, including roughly 75,000 in the Army, 20,200 in the Navy, and 22,200 in the Air and Space Force, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2024 IISS. SIPRI estimates Spain’s military expenditure at about $24.7 billion in 2024 in current US dollars, up sharply from the previous year but still around 1.5% of GDP, below NATO’s 2% benchmark SIPRI. The Sánchez government has nonetheless committed to reaching 2% of GDP on defense and framed the increase as necessary for both national and allied security Government of Spain, Presidency. Spain’s capability profile reflects that strategy: a blue-water navy, combat air assets, and deployable land forces suited to NATO, EU, and UN missions rather than unilateral warfighting on Europe’s eastern flank NATO, Ministry of Defence of Spain.

Alliance commitments define Spanish defense policy more than any standalone doctrine. Spain is a NATO member and hosts major allied infrastructure, including the naval base at Rota, used heavily for US and NATO maritime operations, and Morón Air Base, which supports rapid response and Africa-facing contingencies NATO, US Department of State. Madrid also contributes forces to NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank and has participated in Baltic Air Policing and multinational battlegroup activities as part of the alliance’s collective defense architecture NATO Allied Air Command, NATO. Within the EU, Spain backs stronger European defense cooperation, including Permanent Structured Cooperation and joint capability development, but usually treats this as complementary to NATO rather than a substitute for US-backed deterrence European External Action Service, Government of Spain, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Spain faces no active insurgency on the mainland and no current domestic armed conflict. ETA formally dissolved in 2018 after ending its armed campaign, removing the country’s main long-running internal security threat Spanish Government, Ministry of the Interior, BBC. The threats Spanish officials now emphasize are Russia’s war against Ukraine and the broader deterioration of Euro-Atlantic security, instability across the Sahel and North Africa, terrorism, cyberattacks, irregular migration pressures, and the protection of maritime approaches in the Mediterranean and Atlantic Spanish National Security Council, National Security Strategy 2021, NATO. Geography shapes this hierarchy. Unlike Poland or the Baltic states, Spain is not a direct front-line state vis-à-vis Russia, so it consistently assigns more attention than many northern allies to the southern neighborhood, especially the Sahel, where coups, jihadist violence, and state weakness are seen as direct spillover risks for Spanish and European security Spanish National Security Strategy 2021, EUISS.

Spain is a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and relies on NATO’s nuclear umbrella rather than an indigenous deterrent United Nations Treaty Collection, NATO. Madrid supports arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament in formal diplomacy, but its practice stays aligned with NATO consensus rather than the more abolitionist line favored by some domestic constituencies; Spain has not joined the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain. On active wars, Spain has strongly backed Ukraine politically, financially, and militarily, including training and materiel support, while stopping short of any posture that would separate it from allied policy discipline Government of Spain, Presidency, European Council. The result is a security policy with clear limits: Spain is dependable in coalitions, serious about maritime and southern-flank security, and increasingly willing to spend more, but it still prefers collective frameworks and calibrated escalation over autonomous hard-power leadership NATO, SIPRI.

Spain is an aging, highly urban society, and that demographic structure shapes everything from welfare politics to labour shortages. Spain’s resident population reached 48.6 million on 1 January 2024, with a median age of 45.6 years and 20.7% of the population aged 65 or older, according to the National Statistics Institute INE. Urban concentration is high: 81.5% of Spain’s population lived in urban areas in 2023, a level consistent with a service-heavy economy and strong regional metropolitan hubs such as Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Seville, and Bilbao World Bank. Immigration has become a major demographic stabiliser. Foreign-born residents accounted for a rising share of the population in recent years, helping offset low fertility and labor-market gaps, while also making migration policy more politically salient OECD International Migration Outlook 2023 INE.

Spain does not collect ethnicity data in the same way as some states, so ethnic composition is better understood through nationality, country of birth, and historical communities rather than fixed official racial categories. The social baseline is a majority native-born Spanish population alongside large communities with roots in Morocco, Romania, Latin America, and increasingly other EU and non-EU states, reflecting two decades of immigration-driven change INE OECD. Religiously, Spain remains historically Catholic but is no longer uniformly observant. Spain’s Constitution guarantees religious freedom and ends any state religion, while recognizing cooperation with the Catholic Church and other faith communities Constitución Española. Survey data show Catholic identity still exceeds half the population, but regular practice is much lower and the share reporting no religion has grown steadily, especially among younger Spaniards Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. That gap between cultural Catholicism and secular daily life matters politically in debates over education, gender policy, abortion, and memory laws.

Linguistic diversity is one of the clearest lines between social cohesion and territorial tension. Castilian Spanish is the official state language, but the Constitution also protects other Spanish languages as co-official in their autonomous communities, including Catalan, Galician, Basque, and, under specific statutes, Valencian and others Constitución Española. In practice, language is not only a cultural marker but a governing instrument tied to schooling, public administration, media, and regional identity. That is most politically charged in Catalonia and, to a lesser extent, the Basque Country, where language policy is bound up with autonomy claims and competing ideas of nationhood Ministerio de Política Territorial Brookings. Spain’s education outcomes are mixed but comparatively solid: in PISA 2022, Spain scored around the OECD average in mathematics and above the OECD average in reading, while showing weaker performance gaps than some peer countries despite persistent regional disparities OECD PISA 2022 Spain Country Note. Tertiary attainment has risen strongly among younger adults, particularly women, but youth unemployment remains structurally high, limiting social mobility despite educational gains OECD Education at a Glance OECD Spain.

Health and social indicators are a major source of cohesion and one reason Spain’s welfare state remains politically resilient. Life expectancy at birth in Spain is among the highest in the EU, reaching 84.0 years in 2023 according to Eurostat, and the country’s universal National Health System remains a core public good despite pressure from aging, staff shortages, and regional management differences Eurostat Ministerio de Sanidad. Social trust in public healthcare and pensions is broad, but material strains are real: high housing costs, precarious work, and youth unemployment have fed discontent, especially in large cities Banco de España OECD Spain. The sharpest social tensions in domestic politics come from three overlaps: centre-periphery conflict over autonomy, class frustration over wages and housing, and cultural polarization over feminism, migration, and historical memory. Against that, Spain also has strong solidarities: support for public health and education, acceptance of regional diversity within a democratic framework, and broad attachment to EU membership as an anchor of stability and prosperity Eurobarometer Real Instituto Elcano.

Spain treats climate policy as both an EU obligation and a domestic competitiveness strategy, but its exposure is hard security as much as regulation. The European Environment Agency classifies southern Europe as one of the continent’s main climate-risk zones, with Spain facing sharper heat extremes, drought, water stress, wildfire risk and coastal impacts than much of northern Europe European Environment Agency. Spain’s national climate adaptation plan identifies water resources, coasts, biodiversity, agriculture, health and cities as priority risk areas under rising temperatures and declining precipitation in many basins Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica y el Reto Demográfico. The IPCC’s Mediterranean assessments are consistent with that reading: warming, drought and compound fire-weather conditions are expected to intensify across the region IPCC. That exposure gives Madrid a strong incentive to back ambitious EU climate rules in principle, even when it pushes for flexibility on implementation costs for farmers, industry, or consumers.

Spain’s energy posture has shifted fast toward renewables, which strengthens its climate diplomacy. In 2024, renewables produced a record share of Spain’s electricity mix, with wind, solar and hydro together dominating generation, while fossil-fired output fell sharply Red Eléctrica. The International Energy Agency also tracks Spain as one of Europe’s largest renewable-power markets, with major recent growth in solar PV and wind, while gas still matters for balancing and industry and nuclear remains part of the system pending phased closure decisions International Energy Agency. On climate commitments, Spain is bound through the EU’s Paris Agreement nationally determined contribution, including the Union-wide target to cut net greenhouse-gas emissions at least 55% by 2030 from 1990 levels UNFCCC European Commission. Domestically, the core legal framework is the 2021 Climate Change and Energy Transition Law, which sets economy-wide decarbonisation direction, promotes renewable deployment and clean mobility, and aims for climate neutrality by 2050 BOE - Ley 7/2021.

The main constraint is not formal ambition but environmental conflict at sector level. Water is the most politically sensitive file: prolonged drought and structural scarcity have intensified disputes over river-basin management, irrigation, and inter-basin transfers, especially around the Tagus-Segura system and groundwater depletion OECD Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica y el Reto Demográfico. Spain has also faced repeated pressure over ecological damage linked to intensive agriculture and groundwater extraction near Doñana; the European Commission referred Spain to the Court of Justice of the EU over failures to protect groundwater bodies feeding the protected wetland, and the Court ruled against Spain in 2021 European Commission Court of Justice of the European Union. On fisheries, Madrid usually defends Spanish fleet access and resists conservation measures it sees as disproportionate, especially in EU negotiations over trawling limits and marine protected areas, reflecting the sector’s political weight Council of the European Union Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación.

Spain’s emissions politics are therefore dual-track: supportive of EU climate ambition, but pragmatic when rules hit transport, agriculture, fisheries, or regional employment. The government’s updated National Energy and Climate Plan raises renewable and emissions-cutting goals for 2030 and is designed to align Spain with the EU’s tightened climate package Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica y el Reto Demográfico European Commission. Spain is less central to global deforestation disputes than major commodity importers, but as an EU member it is part of the bloc’s anti-deforestation regulatory framework and related trade frictions European Commission. The practical read for negotiators is clear: Spain will usually align with mainstream EU climate positions, press hard for renewable investment and adaptation finance, and then carve out room for water security, food production, fleet interests and a gradual social transition at home Government of Spain - Long-Term Decarbonization Strategy.

Spain’s most consequential foreign-policy shift in the last 90 days was its visible move to resist a harder EU line on China while keeping its core Atlantic and European commitments intact. On 30 May, POLITICO reported that Madrid distanced itself from a push by some EU governments for a tougher common approach to Beijing, reflecting Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s preference for economic hedging over ideological confrontation and Spain’s interest in preserving trade and investment channels with China POLITICO. That is consistent with Sánchez’s April 2025 trip to Beijing, where he met Xi Jinping and defended a “balanced” EU-China relationship even as Brussels sharpened its de-risking agenda La Moncloa, European Council. The practical point for delegates is that Spain remains firmly inside the EU-NATO mainstream on Russia and European security, but it is positioning itself as one of the larger member states least interested in turning de-risking into broad economic decoupling from China NATO, European Commission.

The other major development was domestic but strategically relevant: a string of regional election setbacks that weakened Sánchez’s room for maneuver ahead of national politics in 2027. On 3 June, POLITICO reported that losses in Andalusia deepened pressure on the governing PSOE and sharpened the national profile of the far right’s “Spaniards first” message on migration and social policy POLITICO. On 5 June, the same outlet described a trio of regional elections as a broader warning sign for Sánchez, with implications for coalition management in Madrid and for Spain’s tone in EU debates where domestic political weakness often pushes governments toward lower-risk, consensus positions POLITICO. This matters externally because Spain’s foreign policy is cabinet-led but coalition-constrained: when Sánchez is politically weakened at home, Madrid usually becomes more cautious on divisive dossiers such as migration burden-sharing, fiscal rules, and China, while staying dependable on NATO, Ukraine, and formal EU unity La Moncloa, Council of the European Union.

The one development to watch next quarter is whether Madrid keeps publicly softening EU language on China after the latest regional-election damage. If Sánchez doubles down on a more commercially pragmatic China line while under domestic pressure from both the right and coalition partners, Spain could become a more important swing state inside the EU’s internal argument over how far “de-risking” should go POLITICO, European Commission.