--- title: "Nordic Cyber Summit 2027 (8th Edition) — Copenhagen" description: "Nordic Cyber Summit 2027 (8th Edition) is a professional conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, Mar 2–3, 2027. Dates, deadlines, fees, and prep links." url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/conferences/professional/nordic-cyber-summit-2027-8th-edition-2027" --- # Nordic Cyber Summit 2027 (8th Edition) Mar 2–3, 2027[Copenhagen, Denmark](https://www.google.com/maps/search/?api=1\&query=Copenhagen%2C%20Denmark)In-person [Registration open](https://nordic.cyberseries.io/) The Nordic Cyber Summit, now in its eighth edition, is a prominent annual gathering for cybersecurity professionals and stakeholders. Hosted in Copenhagen, DNK, the summit serves as a critical forum for addressing the evolving landscape of cyber threats, exchanging insights on best practices, and cultivating collaborative strategies to fortify digital resilience across industries and national borders. Its consistent recurrence underscores the enduring importance of collective action in cybersecurity. ## Committees & topics - Topics Collaborative Security: Aligning Priorities Across the IT Team · Compliance and Guidance: Preparing for Current and Future Regulations · Bouncing Back: Maintaining Resilience in Times of Crisis · Beyond Burnout: Managing Stress in Cyber Security · Trusted Partners: Navigating Third-Party Cyber Security in a Changing World · IT Security · OT Security · Digital Forensics ## Why it matters In an era defined by increasing digital interconnectedness, the Nordic Cyber Summit plays a vital role in shaping regional and international cybersecurity agendas. The event brings together a diverse array of participants, including government officials, industry leaders, academic researchers, and technology innovators, to engage in substantive discussions on topics ranging from advanced persistent threats to regulatory frameworks. This multidisciplinary approach is essential for developing comprehensive and adaptive cybersecurity strategies. The summit's focus on collaboration is particularly significant. Cyber threats do not respect geographical boundaries, making international cooperation indispensable. By facilitating dialogue and partnership among key actors, the event helps to build a stronger, more unified front against malicious cyber activities. This collective intelligence and shared commitment are crucial for protecting critical infrastructure, safeguarding sensitive data, and maintaining trust in digital systems. ## How to prepare Delegates preparing for the Nordic Cyber Summit should focus on understanding the current geopolitical context of cybersecurity, particularly as it pertains to the Nordic region and broader European security. Familiarity with the cybersecurity policies and challenges faced by countries like FIN, SWE, NOR, and EST will provide valuable background. Consider how national strategies intersect with international efforts and the implications of emerging technologies on defense postures. Effective participation will also benefit from an understanding of stakeholder dynamics within the cybersecurity ecosystem. Reviewing lessons such as "what-is-stakeholder-mapping" and "engagement-strategies" can help in identifying key actors and potential collaboration opportunities. Given the event's focus on practical solutions, participants should be prepared to discuss concrete examples of successful cyber defense initiatives and to articulate potential challenges in their implementation. Engaging with the "dynamic-analysis" lesson can also provide a framework for assessing evolving threat landscapes. ## Country perspectives Where the most-relevant 5 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile. [Denmark](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/denmark) [Host nation and a key player in European cybersecurity initiatives.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/denmark) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/denmark) [As the host city, Copenhagen, DNK, provides a central European location for this critical cybersecurity dialogue. Denmark is actively involved in regional and international cybersecurity cooperation, contributing to discussions on digital resilience and critical infrastructure protection.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/denmark) [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Pioneer in digital governance and cyber defense, offering lessons in national resilience.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Estonia is widely recognized for its advanced digital society and robust cyber defense capabilities. Its experiences with sophisticated cyberattacks provide valuable case studies and best practices for national cybersecurity strategies, making its perspective crucial for discussions on resilience.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Actively engaged in Nordic and EU cybersecurity cooperation, focusing on national security.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Finland is a significant contributor to Nordic and European cybersecurity efforts, emphasizing national security and critical infrastructure protection. Its insights into hybrid threats and defense strategies are particularly relevant in the current geopolitical climate.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Sweden](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Committed to strengthening national cyber defenses and international collaboration.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Sweden is dedicated to enhancing its national cyber defenses and fostering international cooperation to combat cyber threats. Its approach often involves a blend of technological innovation and policy development, offering a valuable perspective on comprehensive cybersecurity frameworks.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Norway](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Focuses on protecting critical infrastructure and maritime cybersecurity.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Norway places a strong emphasis on safeguarding its critical infrastructure, particularly in energy and maritime sectors, from cyber threats. Its expertise in these specialized areas contributes unique insights to the broader cybersecurity discourse.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) ## Topics & background The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it. 1 ### Collaborative Security: Aligning Priorities Across the IT Team For much of the early internet era, cybersecurity was treated as a narrow subdiscipline of IT — a matter for a small team of specialists handling firewalls, antivirus, and patch management. As digital transformation accelerated through the 2010s, security responsibilities fragmented across network engineering, application development, cloud operations, identity management, and increasingly, dedicated SecOps and GRC functions. This specialization improved depth but created friction: competing key performance indicators, siloed tooling, and conflicting change-management timelines have repeatedly been identified in incident post-mortems as contributors to delayed detection and response. The shift toward DevSecOps, zero-trust architectures, and platform engineering has pushed organizations to reintegrate these functions around shared risk objectives. Frameworks such as NIST CSF 2.0 (2024) and ENISA guidance now explicitly emphasize governance and cross-functional accountability rather than purely technical controls. In Nordic enterprises and public-sector bodies, where lean IT teams must cover broad attack surfaces, alignment between infrastructure, development, and security leadership has become a board-level concern. The debate today centers on how to operationalize collaboration without diluting accountability: shared risk registers, joint runbooks, unified observability, and clearer escalation paths. The challenge is cultural as much as technical, given persistent differences in incentives between speed-oriented engineering teams and risk-oriented security functions. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Origin of dominant frameworks (NIST CSF, zero trust) and major enterprise tooling vendors](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Reference model for integrated public-sector IT and security governance](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) - [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Home to Traficom/NCSC-FI and strong industry practice on IT/security coordination](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) - [Sweden](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Large enterprise base navigating siloed legacy IT and modern SecOps integration](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) - [Norway](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [NSM-led national guidance shaping cross-team security baselines](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) 2 ### Compliance and Guidance: Preparing for Current and Future Regulations Europe's cybersecurity regulatory landscape has expanded dramatically since the original 2016 NIS Directive. The NIS2 Directive, adopted in 2022 and transposed across EU member states through 2024–2025, significantly broadens the scope of regulated 'essential' and 'important' entities and imposes stricter incident reporting and management accountability. In parallel, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) entered into application in January 2025 for the financial sector, the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) was adopted in 2024 to govern products with digital elements, and the AI Act introduced layered obligations on high-risk AI systems. Nordic non-EU states such as Norway align via the EEA, while the UK pursues parallel frameworks. For organizations operating across the Nordics, the compliance burden has shifted from a checklist exercise to a continuous, evidence-based discipline. Boards and management bodies now face direct liability under NIS2; supply chain security obligations cut across CRA, DORA, and sectoral rules; and overlapping reporting timelines (notably the 24/72-hour NIS2 incident notifications) require pre-built playbooks. Sectoral regulators — financial supervisors, energy authorities, and data protection authorities — are increasing coordinated enforcement. Looking forward, debate focuses on harmonization versus fragmentation: how to reconcile EU instruments with national implementations, sector-specific rules, and international regimes such as the US SEC cyber disclosure rules and emerging frameworks in the Indo-Pacific. The risk of duplicative reporting and 'compliance theater' is rising alongside genuine improvements in baseline security. Key players - [Belgium](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [Seat of EU institutions driving NIS2, DORA, CRA, and AI Act](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Largest EU economy shaping NIS2 transposition and CRA implementation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Denmark](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/denmark) [Nordic EU member coordinating financial and critical-sector compliance](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/denmark) - [Sweden](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Major regulated industrial and financial base under NIS2/DORA](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) - [Norway](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [EEA implementer aligning national law with EU cyber acquis](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Influential extraterritorial regime via SEC disclosure and federal cyber rules](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) 3 ### Bouncing Back: Maintaining Resilience in Times of Crisis Cyber resilience as a distinct discipline emerged from the recognition that prevention alone is insufficient. The 2017 NotPetya attack, attributed by multiple governments to Russian military actors, caused billions in damages to firms including Maersk and Merck and reshaped corporate thinking about destructive cyberattacks. Subsequent ransomware campaigns — Colonial Pipeline (2021), Kaseya (2021), and a wave of healthcare and municipal incidents — reinforced the need for tested recovery capabilities, not just defensive controls. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, accompanied by wiper malware and attacks on satellite communications, demonstrated that cyber incidents can occur amid kinetic crises and infrastructure disruption. In the Nordic region, resilience considerations have sharpened with NATO accession by Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024), heightened sabotage concerns around Baltic Sea cables and energy infrastructure, and explicit hybrid threat assessments from national security services. Regulatory expectations now codify resilience: DORA mandates threat-led penetration testing and exit strategies for ICT third parties; NIS2 requires business continuity and crisis management measures; and national total-defense doctrines integrate civilian cyber preparedness. Current debates address how to measure resilience credibly, how often to exercise full recovery (including offline backups and manual fallback), and how to maintain continuity during prolonged compound crises involving cyber, physical, and information operations simultaneously. Key players - [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Total-defense model integrating cyber, civil, and military resilience](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) - [Sweden](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Reviving civil defense and critical-infrastructure resilience planning](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) - [Norway](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Frontline state for subsea cable and energy infrastructure protection](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) - [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Operational case study in sustaining services under sustained cyber and kinetic attack](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) - [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Pioneer of data embassies and continuity-of-government cyber concepts](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [CISA-led frameworks on operational resilience and sector coordination](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) 4 ### Beyond Burnout: Managing Stress in Cyber Security Burnout in cybersecurity has moved from anecdote to documented occupational hazard. Studies by ISACA, (ISC)², ENISA, and academic researchers consistently report elevated stress, attrition, and mental-health symptoms among SOC analysts, incident responders, and CISOs. Drivers include 24/7 on-call rotations, alert fatigue from immature tooling, adversarial pressure that intensified through the ransomware boom of 2020–2023, and the personal liability now attached to senior security roles under regimes such as NIS2 and US SEC rules. The high-profile 2023 conviction of Uber's former CISO underscored the legal stakes facing individual practitioners. The global cyber workforce gap, estimated by (ISC)² at roughly four million unfilled roles, compounds the problem: existing staff absorb more work, training budgets are squeezed, and turnover spreads institutional knowledge thin. Nordic employers, operating in tight labor markets with strong workplace-health traditions, have begun treating cyber workforce wellbeing as both a duty-of-care issue and an operational risk. Policy and practice debates focus on sustainable staffing models, automation of toil through SOAR and AI-assisted triage, psychological safety in post-incident reviews, clearer escalation and decision-rights for executives, and protections that distinguish honest errors from misconduct. The underlying question is whether the current operating model of cybersecurity is structurally sustainable. Key players - [Norway](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Strong occupational-health framework applied to cyber workforce policy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) - [Sweden](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Industry leader in workplace wellbeing standards relevant to SOC operations](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) - [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Active research base on cognitive load and human factors in cyber defense](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) - [Denmark](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/denmark) [Public-private collaboration on cyber skills pipeline and retention](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/denmark) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Source of major workforce studies and shifting CISO liability landscape](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [NCSC guidance and academic work on cyber workforce burnout](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) 5 ### Trusted Partners: Navigating Third-Party Cyber Security in a Changing World Supply chain compromises have become one of the most consequential categories of cyber incident. The 2020 SolarWinds intrusion, attributed by US authorities to Russia's SVR, exposed how a single trusted software update could reach thousands of downstream customers including federal agencies. The 2021 Kaseya VSA ransomware incident, the 2023 MOVEit Transfer mass exploitation by the Cl0p group, and the 2024 disruption following the CrowdStrike content-update incident — though not an attack — collectively demonstrated systemic dependencies on a small number of software and security providers. Regulatory responses have followed quickly. NIS2 explicitly requires supply chain risk management; DORA imposes detailed third-party ICT risk obligations on financial entities, including a register of information and oversight of critical ICT providers; the EU Cyber Resilience Act extends security requirements to product manufacturers across the lifecycle; and US Executive Order 14028 (2021) accelerated SBOM adoption and secure software development frameworks. Geopolitically, restrictions on specific vendors — from Huawei in 5G to Kaspersky in several jurisdictions — illustrate how third-party risk now intersects with export controls and national security. For Nordic organizations, debate centers on practical assurance: how to assess thousands of suppliers proportionately, how to use SBOMs and attestations meaningfully, how to plan for concentration risk in cloud and security tooling, and how to manage geopolitical exposure in hardware and software sourcing. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Home to dominant cloud, security, and software vendors; driver of SBOM and SSDF norms](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Major supplier of hardware and software subject to growing scrutiny and restrictions](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Industrial base advancing supply chain due diligence and CRA implementation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Belgium](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [EU policymaking hub for NIS2, DORA, and CRA third-party rules](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) - [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Telecom and critical-infrastructure ecosystem highly exposed to vendor risk](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) - [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Major source of cybersecurity products central to global supply chains](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) 6 ### IT Security Information technology security as a corporate discipline took shape in the 1990s and 2000s around perimeter defense, endpoint protection, identity management, and patching. The widespread shift to cloud services in the 2010s, accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic's remote-work surge, dissolved the classical perimeter and pushed organizations toward zero-trust architectures, identity-centric controls, and SaaS-aware monitoring. At the same time, threat actors professionalized: ransomware-as-a-service ecosystems, initial access brokers, and state-aligned intrusion sets significantly raised the baseline level of risk for ordinary enterprises. Today, IT security teams confront an environment shaped by ubiquitous cloud and SaaS, AI-assisted phishing and code generation, persistent identity-based attacks (token theft, MFA fatigue, OAuth abuse), and tightening regulatory expectations under NIS2 and sectoral rules. Frameworks such as NIST CSF 2.0, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, and the CIS Controls v8 anchor program design, while operational practice increasingly relies on EDR/XDR, SIEM consolidation, and SOAR automation. Key debates include how to operationalize zero trust beyond marketing, how to secure AI adoption inside the enterprise, how to manage identity as the new perimeter, and how to balance investment between prevention, detection, and recovery in resource-constrained environments. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Leading source of IT security standards, products, and threat intelligence](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [NCSC-led guidance influential across European enterprise IT security](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [BSI standards and IT-Grundschutz widely used across European enterprises](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Reference architecture for secure digital government and identity](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) - [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Strong national CSIRT capability and enterprise security maturity](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) - [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Major innovation hub for enterprise IT security technologies](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) 7 ### OT Security Operational technology — the industrial control systems, SCADA networks, PLCs, and safety instrumented systems running factories, grids, pipelines, and utilities — was historically isolated and considered low-risk from cyber threats. That assumption collapsed with Stuxnet's exposure in 2010, followed by attacks on Ukraine's power grid in 2015 and 2016, the 2017 Triton/Trisis incident targeting a Saudi petrochemical safety system, the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware shutdown, and continued targeting of energy and water utilities. Industrial environments are now firmly in scope for both criminal and state-aligned actors. Convergence of IT and OT, driven by Industry 4.0, predictive maintenance, and remote operations, has expanded attack surfaces while many OT assets remain difficult to patch and have decades-long lifecycles. Regulatory pressure has grown sharply: NIS2 covers energy, water, manufacturing, and transport; the EU Cyber Resilience Act addresses security of products with digital elements including many industrial components; and standards such as IEC 62443 have become central to OT security programs. In the Nordics, concerns about sabotage of energy infrastructure, subsea cables, and Arctic operations have heightened national attention to OT. Current debate focuses on segmentation between IT and OT, safe deployment of monitoring in sensitive industrial networks, secure remote access for engineers and vendors, vulnerability management on legacy systems, and the integration of OT incidents into enterprise crisis management. Key players - [Norway](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Major operator of energy and offshore infrastructure with high OT exposure](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) - [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Industrial and energy base with strong OT security policy leadership](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Manufacturing core driving IEC 62443 adoption and OT vendor practice](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [CISA and sector-specific agencies leading ICS threat intelligence](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Frontline experience defending power and industrial systems under attack](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Persistent threat actor targeting energy and industrial OT environments](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) 8 ### Digital Forensics Digital forensics evolved from law-enforcement disk imaging in the 1990s into a broad discipline spanning host, network, cloud, memory, and mobile forensics. As enterprises moved workloads to cloud and SaaS, classical forensic methods — full disk imaging, on-premises log collection — became insufficient. Investigators now rely heavily on cloud audit logs (where retention and granularity vary by provider and license tier), endpoint telemetry from EDR, and ephemeral artifacts from containers and serverless environments. High-profile investigations into SolarWinds, Microsoft Exchange/Hafnium, and large ransomware incidents have shaped contemporary playbooks. Legal and regulatory pressure has reinforced the importance of forensically sound practice. NIS2 and DORA incident-reporting timelines require rapid yet accurate triage; GDPR mandates assessment of personal-data impact; criminal investigations require chain-of-custody discipline; and cyber insurance increasingly conditions payouts on documented forensic findings. Cross-border investigations rely on instruments such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and mutual legal assistance, both under strain as data volumes and jurisdictional complexity grow. Key debates concern visibility gaps in cloud and SaaS (notably logging access and cost), the role of AI in accelerating triage and timeline reconstruction, attribution challenges, preservation of volatile evidence, and how to maintain skilled forensic capacity inside organizations versus relying on external incident response retainers. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Leading forensic tooling, cloud-provider logging ecosystems, and FBI/CISA practice](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [NCA and NCSC shaping forensic and incident response standards](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [Netherlands](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/netherlands) [Host to Europol/EC3 and major cross-border cybercrime investigations](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/netherlands) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [BSI and BKA leading European forensic methodology and casework](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Operational expertise from sustained nation-state incident handling](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) - [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Active national CSIRT and forensic community supporting Nordic investigations](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) ## Resources News, lessons, and country profiles to prep for Nordic Cyber Summit 2027 (8th Edition). Recent reporting to ground your prep [Ken Martin's DNC Autopsy Reveals Party Strugg](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/ken-martins-dnc-autopsy-fight-exposes-party-weakness) [DNC Autopsy Reveals Democrats' 2024 Failures](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/dnc-autopsy-exposes-democrats-2024-blame-game) [Trump's Legal Battles Impact 2026 Elections](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/trumps-legal-battles-and-political-influence-shape-2026-elections) [GOP Conservative Factions Clash Over Trump](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/gops-conservative-factions-clash-amid-trumps-influence) Lessons Bite-sized lessons to build the basics [Gender Dynamics Across Cultures](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/gender-dynamics-across-cultures) [Hidden Stakeholders](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/hidden-stakeholders) [Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies) [Dynamic Analysis](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis) Courses Guided courses that go deeper on the topic [Advanced Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/advanced-negotiation) [Multilateral Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/multilateral-negotiation) [Policy Brief Writing](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/policy-brief) [Conflict Resolution](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/conflict-resolution) The states in play, with the data that shapes their stance [Denmark](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/denmark) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/denmark) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Sweden](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Norway](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Belgium](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Netherlands](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/netherlands) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/netherlands) ## Frequently asked questions - - - Free account Save conferences, research any topic with AI, build position papers, and keep your daily prep streak — free. 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