--- title: "Media and Politics 2027 — London | Model Diplomat" description: "Media and Politics & Technology, Internet, and Policy Joint Annual Conference is a professional conference in London, United Kingdom, Jan 12–13, 2027." url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/conferences/professional/media-and-politics-technology-internet-and-policy-joint-annual-conference-2027" --- # Media and Politics & Technology, Internet, and Policy Joint Annual Conference Jan 12–13, 2027[London, United Kingdom](https://www.google.com/maps/search/?api=1\&query=London%2C%20United%20Kingdom)In-person [Registration open](https://www.psa.ac.uk/event/mpgtipconf2027/) The Media and Politics & Technology, Internet, and Policy Joint Annual Conference is a significant gathering focusing on the intricate relationship between media, politics, and technology. Held in London, GBR, this event brings together experts and practitioners to discuss contemporary challenges and future directions in these interconnected fields. It serves as a platform for exploring how digital advancements and evolving media landscapes influence political processes and policy-making. ## Committees & topics - Topics ICTs and Digital Platforms as Drivers of Citizen Engagement and a Democratised Public Sphere · Deepfakes and AI-Generated Imagery in the Modern Online Public Sphere · ICTs and Digital Platforms in Political Campaigning, Marketing, and Voter Engagement · Social Media Algorithms and Their Impact on Political Discussion · Reliability of Information on ICTs and Online Platforms · Ethical Implications of Dis- and Misinformation in the Rational Public Sphere · Digital Platforms as Spaces for Democratic Movements Under Authoritarian Pressure · Regulatory and Policy Frameworks for Trustworthy and Accountable Digital Platforms ## Why it matters In an era defined by rapid technological change and shifting political dynamics, understanding the interplay between media, politics, and technology is crucial. This conference addresses how digital platforms shape public discourse, influence electoral outcomes, and impact governance. The discussions at this event are vital for policymakers, academics, and industry leaders seeking to navigate the complexities of the digital age. The insights generated from this conference can inform strategies for combating misinformation, promoting digital literacy, and fostering more inclusive political participation. As societies grapple with issues such as data privacy, algorithmic bias, and the weaponization of information, the collaborative exchange of ideas facilitated by this event is indispensable for developing robust and ethical frameworks for the future. ## How to prepare Attendees preparing for this conference should focus on current trends in digital media, political communication, and internet governance. Familiarity with recent case studies involving social media's impact on elections, the role of artificial intelligence in policy analysis, and debates around internet regulation will be particularly beneficial. Consider how different national contexts, such as those in the USA, CHN, or EST, approach these issues, as diverse perspectives will enrich discussions. To maximize engagement, participants should be ready to contribute to discussions on the ethical implications of emerging technologies and their effects on democratic institutions. Reviewing materials on topics such as "engagement-strategies" and "dynamic-analysis" can provide valuable frameworks for understanding the complex interactions between various stakeholders in the media and political spheres. Preparing questions that delve into the practical applications of research findings and policy recommendations will also enhance the overall experience. ## Country perspectives Where the most-relevant 5 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile. [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [A key host and participant, likely contributing insights on regulatory approaches to media and technology within a democratic framework.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [As the host country, GBR provides a significant intellectual hub for discussions on media regulation, digital policy, and the impact of technology on its political landscape. Its experiences with evolving media ecosystems and legislative responses to digital challenges will be central to the conference's discourse.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [A major player in technological innovation and media influence, offering perspectives on platform governance and freedom of speech.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [The USA is a global leader in technology development and has a profound influence on global media trends. Its perspective will be crucial for discussions on the power of tech giants, content moderation, and the balance between free speech and online safety, particularly given its unique constitutional framework.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [A significant case study for state control over media and internet, presenting an alternative model of digital governance.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [CHN offers a contrasting model of internet governance, characterized by extensive state control and censorship. Its approach to digital policy, data management, and the use of technology for social control provides a critical comparative perspective for understanding the diverse global landscape of media and politics.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [A pioneer in digital governance and e-democracy, showcasing innovative approaches to technology in public administration.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [EST is renowned for its advanced digital infrastructure and e-governance initiatives. Its experiences with digital identity, online voting, and cybersecurity offer valuable lessons on how technology can be leveraged to enhance public services and democratic participation, while also addressing associated risks.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [A large and diverse democracy grappling with digital inclusion, misinformation, and internet shutdowns.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [IND represents a large-scale democratic experiment in the digital age, facing challenges related to digital literacy, the spread of misinformation on social media, and the implications of internet shutdowns. Its experiences highlight the complexities of digital transformation in a diverse and populous nation.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) ## Topics & background The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it. 1 ### ICTs and Digital Platforms as Drivers of Citizen Engagement and a Democratised Public Sphere The notion that information and communication technologies (ICTs) could democratise the public sphere traces back to early internet optimism in the 1990s, when scholars such as Howard Rheingold and later Yochai Benkler argued that networked communication would lower barriers to political participation and dismantle gatekeeping by traditional media. The 2009 Iranian Green Movement, the 2010-2012 Arab uprisings, and movements like #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo appeared to validate this thesis, demonstrating how platforms could mobilise citizens, surface marginalised voices, and force issues onto political agendas without legacy media intermediaries. The core dispute today centres on whether platforms genuinely broaden Habermasian deliberation or merely simulate it. Critics including Evgeny Morozov and Zeynep Tufekci point to engagement-optimised feeds, harassment, surveillance capitalism, and the collapse of shared factual baselines. Empirical research from Pew, Reuters Institute, and Oxford's OII shows participation gains concentrated among already-engaged demographics, while affective polarisation has risen across most OECD democracies. The issue now sits at the intersection of the EU Digital Services Act, the UN Global Digital Compact (2024), and national debates over platform liability. Governments, civil society, and platforms continue to negotiate how to preserve the participatory upside while addressing inequality of voice, algorithmic curation, and the erosion of local journalism that once anchored civic discussion. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Home to dominant platforms (Meta, X, Google) shaping global public-sphere norms](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - EUU Sets binding rules via the DSA and Digital Markets Act framing platform accountability - [India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [Largest user base; testbed for both mass digital participation and platform restrictions](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) - [Brazil](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/brazil) [Active digital electorate and pioneer of judicial platform oversight](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/brazil) - [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Reference case for state-led digital democracy and e-participation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) 2 ### Deepfakes and AI-Generated Imagery in the Modern Online Public Sphere Synthetic media emerged from academic GAN research (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and entered public consciousness through the 2017 'deepfakes' Reddit community. The technology rapidly moved from non-consensual imagery to political contexts: fabricated videos of Gabon's Ali Bongo (2018), Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelenskyy urging surrender (2022), and AI-generated robocalls impersonating Joe Biden in the 2024 New Hampshire primary. Generative tools such as Midjourney, Stable Diffusion, and ElevenLabs have made high-quality fabrications cheap and fast. The core dispute is twofold. First, the epistemic problem: when any image, voice, or video can be plausibly faked, audiences face both deception by fabricated content and the 'liar's dividend' (Chesney & Citron), in which authentic evidence is dismissed as fake. Second, the regulatory problem: how to restrict harmful synthetic political content without chilling satire, art, and legitimate speech. Watermarking standards such as C2PA and provenance tools from Adobe, Google, and OpenAI remain voluntary and easily stripped. The EU AI Act (2024) requires labelling of synthetic media, China's deep synthesis rules (2023) impose provider obligations, and US states have passed election-specific deepfake laws. Yet enforcement across jurisdictions, open-source models, and encrypted platforms remains the central unresolved challenge. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Leading AI developer base; patchwork of state-level deepfake election laws](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [First major jurisdiction to regulate deep synthesis with mandatory labelling](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Online Safety Act addresses synthetic intimate imagery and election interference](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Frontline target of wartime deepfake disinformation campaigns](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) - [South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea) [Acute deepfake harms case driving rapid criminal-law response](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea) 3 ### ICTs and Digital Platforms in Political Campaigning, Marketing, and Voter Engagement Digital campaigning matured with Howard Dean's 2004 online fundraising experiments and Barack Obama's data-driven 2008 and 2012 operations, which integrated email lists, microtargeted advertising, and volunteer coordination tools. The 2016 US election and the Cambridge Analytica scandal exposed how psychographic profiling and Facebook's ad infrastructure could be weaponised, prompting global scrutiny of digital electioneering. Since then, campaigns from Modi's BJP to Bolsonaro's WhatsApp networks to Milei's TikTok-native run in Argentina have demonstrated how platform-native strategies can outperform legacy broadcast approaches. The core dispute is whether digital tools democratise political competition by lowering entry costs for insurgent candidates, or entrench information asymmetries through opaque microtargeting, dark ads, and influencer-driven persuasion. Disclosure rules vary widely: the EU's Regulation on Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (2024) imposes strict obligations, while the US still lacks a federal online political ad transparency law after the Honest Ads Act stalled. Generative AI is now the frontier: campaigns deploy AI-written outreach, synthetic spokespeople, and automated micro-content. Regulators, election commissions, and platforms are scrambling to define rules on AI disclosure, foreign interference, and the role of encrypted messaging apps, which remain largely outside content-moderation regimes. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Largest digital political ad market and template for data-driven campaigning](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [World's largest electorate with WhatsApp- and YouTube-centric campaign ecosystems](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) - [Brazil](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/brazil) [TSE has actively regulated AI and platform conduct during national elections](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/brazil) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Electoral Commission and ICO oversight following Vote Leave and Cambridge Analytica inquiries](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [Argentina](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/argentina) [Recent case of a platform-native populist campaign reshaping mainstream tactics](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/argentina) 4 ### Social Media Algorithms and Their Impact on Political Discussion Algorithmic curation replaced chronological feeds across major platforms between roughly 2009 (Facebook EdgeRank) and 2016, optimising for engagement signals such as dwell time, comments, and shares. Researchers including Eli Pariser ('filter bubbles'), Cass Sunstein ('echo chambers'), and later Chris Bail have debated whether these systems narrow political exposure or, conversely, expose users to more cross-cutting but more hostile content. Internal documents disclosed by Frances Haugen in 2021 showed Meta was aware that ranking changes amplified divisive content and harmed civic discourse. The core dispute is empirical and normative. Empirically, the 2023 Science studies on the 2020 US election (conducted with Meta) found algorithmic feeds did not by themselves change political attitudes in the short term, yet did shape exposure to misinformation and ideological content. Normatively, the debate concerns whether platforms should be liable for amplification choices, whether users deserve a 'right to a non-personalised feed' (as the DSA grants), and how recommendation systems should treat political content at all — TikTok and YouTube Shorts have intensified these questions through short-form virality. The issue now centres on transparency mandates (DSA Article 40 researcher access), algorithmic auditing standards, and ongoing US Supreme Court jurisprudence (Moody v. NetChoice, 2024) on whether content curation is protected editorial speech, which constrains regulatory options in the United States. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Jurisdiction of major platforms; First Amendment shapes the limits of algorithmic regulation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - EUU DSA imposes systemic risk assessments and researcher data access on Very Large Online Platforms - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Algorithmic Recommendation Regulation (2022) requires registration and user opt-out](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Australia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) [Active enforcer through eSafety Commissioner and News Media Bargaining Code](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [NetzDG and DSA implementation leader on platform accountability](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) 5 ### Reliability of Information on ICTs and Online Platforms The shift of news consumption to digital platforms — Reuters Institute's Digital News Report consistently shows social media as a primary news source for a majority of under-35s in most democracies — has unbundled journalism from its traditional editorial and economic supports. Local newspapers have collapsed across North America and Europe, while platforms capture the bulk of digital advertising revenue. Simultaneously, fact-checking organisations (IFCN network), platform labelling, and Community Notes-style crowdsourced moderation have emerged as compensating mechanisms with mixed results. The core dispute is whether platforms are net providers of access to credible information — through search, expert voices, and rapid news during crises — or net amplifiers of unreliable content through engagement-optimised ranking and the decline of paid journalism. Events including COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, and the Israel-Hamas conflict produced both unprecedented real-time citizen reporting and large-scale circulation of false or decontextualised material. Current policy debates focus on news bargaining laws (Australia, Canada), platform downranking of news (Meta's de-prioritisation of political content and news links in 2023-2024), and the integration of generative AI into search via tools like Google's AI Overviews, which raise new questions about attribution, accuracy, and the sustainability of original reporting. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Hosts the platforms and AI models reshaping the global information environment](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Canada](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/canada) [Online News Act (C-18) test case for compelling platform payments to publishers](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/canada) - [Australia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) [Pioneer of the News Media Bargaining Code](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Active enforcer of neighbouring rights for press publishers under EU copyright law](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Singapore](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/singapore) [POFMA framework illustrates state-led correction-order approach to online falsehoods](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/singapore) 6 ### Ethical Implications of Dis- and Misinformation in the Rational Public Sphere Concerns about organised falsehood are not new — propaganda studies date to Lippmann and Lasswell — but the post-2016 period crystallised dis/misinformation as a defining concern, following Russian Internet Research Agency operations, Brexit campaigning, and the WHO-declared 'infodemic' during COVID-19. Scholars distinguish disinformation (deliberately false), misinformation (inadvertently false), and malinformation (true but weaponised), with each posing distinct ethical and regulatory challenges. The core ethical dispute involves a trilemma between truth, autonomy, and free expression. Aggressive content removal risks state or corporate paternalism and chills dissent, particularly in fragile democracies; permissive approaches allow demonstrable harms to health, elections, and minority communities. The 2023-2024 rollback of platform trust-and-safety teams, the dismantling of the US State Department's Global Engagement Center, and litigation such as Murthy v. Missouri have narrowed what governments and platforms can coordinate on, even as foreign influence operations from Russia, China, and Iran have grown more sophisticated. The debate now revolves around prebunking and media-literacy strategies (Finland, Sweden, Taiwan as reference cases), the ethics of platform interventions, and the Habermasian question of whether rational deliberation is structurally possible in an attention economy that rewards emotional and identity-confirming content. Key players - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [State-linked information operations targeting Western and Global South audiences](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Central battleground for dis/misinformation policy and First Amendment limits](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Leading model of national media-literacy curricula and societal resilience](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) - [Taiwan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/taiwan) [Innovator in rapid civic fact-checking and humour-based counter-messaging](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/taiwan) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Source of sophisticated cross-platform influence operations and domestic information control](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) 7 ### Digital Platforms as Spaces for Democratic Movements Under Authoritarian Pressure From Iran's 2009 Green Movement and the 2010-2012 Arab uprisings to Hong Kong's 2019-2020 protests, Belarus 2020, Myanmar's anti-coup resistance, Iran's 2022 'Woman, Life, Freedom' mobilisation, and Russian anti-war organising, digital platforms have repeatedly served as infrastructure for protest, documentation, and diaspora coordination. Encrypted tools such as Signal, Telegram, and Tor, plus circumvention tools funded by the US Open Technology Fund, have been central to operational security. The core dispute is whether platforms remain a net asset for democratic movements or have become primarily tools of authoritarian surveillance and control. Regimes have learned to combine internet shutdowns (documented by Access Now's #KeepItOn), spyware (Pegasus revelations, 2021), platform-pressure for user data, and domestic alternatives (Weibo, VK, RuTube) to constrain dissent. Platforms themselves face commercial and legal pressure to comply with local laws, as seen in X's compliance with Turkish and Indian takedown orders and Apple's removal of VPN apps in China. Current policy debates concern the responsibilities of platforms and democratic governments to protect activists, the export controls on surveillance technology (EU dual-use regulation, US Commerce Entity List), and the role of bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council in defending digital freedoms without legitimising state-led 'internet sovereignty' frameworks. Key players - [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Major site of platform-enabled protest and one of the world's most aggressive internet restrictors](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Architect of the most comprehensive censorship and surveillance apparatus globally](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Restricts foreign platforms while exporting an 'information sovereignty' model](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Hosts dominant platforms and funds circumvention tools through OTF and State Department](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Myanmar](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/myanmar) [Post-coup case of platform-enabled resistance amid junta-imposed shutdowns](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/myanmar) - [Belarus](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belarus) [Telegram-coordinated 2020 protest movement and subsequent severe digital repression](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belarus) 8 ### Regulatory and Policy Frameworks for Trustworthy and Accountable Digital Platforms Global platform regulation has shifted decisively from self-governance toward binding rules. The EU's Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act (in force 2023-2024) impose obligations on systemic risk, transparency, and gatekeeper conduct; the UK's Online Safety Act (2023) creates duties of care enforced by Ofcom; Australia's eSafety regime, Singapore's POFMA and Online Safety code, and India's IT Rules 2021 each pursue different balances of liability, takedown, and traceability. The US, despite repeated congressional hearings, retains the broad intermediary immunity of Section 230 CDA, with regulation occurring largely through antitrust litigation and state laws. The core dispute is how to define accountability without producing either fragmented compliance regimes that entrench incumbents or government-led content control that undermines expression. Civil society coalitions (Santa Clara Principles, Article 19, EDRi) push for due-process, transparency, and human-rights-by-design standards, while platforms argue for harmonisation and proportionality. The rise of generative AI has added another regulatory layer through the EU AI Act, the US AI Executive Order and its successor frameworks, and the Bletchley/Seoul/Paris AI Safety Summit process. Key unresolved questions include meaningful researcher and auditor access to platform data, cross-border enforcement against non-cooperative jurisdictions, liability allocation across the AI value chain, and whether interoperability and middleware mandates could restructure platform power more durably than content rules. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Home jurisdiction of major platforms; Section 230 and First Amendment shape global rule limits](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Early mover with NetzDG and influential voice in DSA implementation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Online Safety Act and Ofcom create a distinct post-Brexit platform regime](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [Brazil](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/brazil) [Marco Civil, PL 2630 debate, and active judicial oversight of platforms](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/brazil) - [India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [IT Rules 2021 and Digital India Act draft set major Global South precedent](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) - [Australia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) [eSafety Commissioner pioneers a regulator-led harms-based approach](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) ## Resources News, lessons, and country profiles to prep for Media and Politics & Technology, Internet, and Policy Joint Annual Conference. Recent reporting to ground your prep [Ken Martin's DNC Autopsy Reveals Party Strugg](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/ken-martins-dnc-autopsy-fight-exposes-party-weakness) [DNC Autopsy Reveals Democrats' 2024 Failures](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/dnc-autopsy-exposes-democrats-2024-blame-game) [Trump's Legal Battles Impact 2026 Elections](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/trumps-legal-battles-and-political-influence-shape-2026-elections) [Trump's Economic Reset](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/trumps-economic-reset-aiming-to-tackle-high-gas-prices) Lessons Bite-sized lessons to build the basics [Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies) [Hidden Stakeholders](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/hidden-stakeholders) [Dynamic Analysis](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis) [Stakeholder Mapping Workshop](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/stakeholder-workshop) Courses Guided courses that go deeper on the topic [Policy Brief Writing](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/policy-brief) [Media & Press Relations](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/media-press) [Advanced Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/advanced-negotiation) [Multilateral Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/multilateral-negotiation) The states in play, with the data that shapes their stance [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [Brazil](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/brazil) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/brazil) [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea) [Argentina](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/argentina) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/argentina) [Australia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Canada](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/canada) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/canada) [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Singapore](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/singapore) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/singapore) [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Taiwan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/taiwan) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/taiwan) [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Myanmar](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/myanmar) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/myanmar) [Belarus](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belarus) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belarus) ## Frequently asked questions - - - Free account Save conferences, research any topic with AI, build position papers, and keep your daily prep streak — free. 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