---
title: "DEFEA – Defence Exhibition Athens 2027 — Athens"
description: "DEFEA – Defence Exhibition Athens 2027 is a professional conference in Athens, Greece, May 18–20, 2027. Dates, deadlines, fees, and prep links."
url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/conferences/professional/defea-defence-exhibition-athens-2027"
---

# DEFEA – Defence Exhibition Athens 2027

May 18–20, 2027[Athens, Greece](https://www.google.com/maps/search/?api=1\&query=Athens%2C%20Greece)In-person

[Registration open](https://www.tradefairdates.com/DEFEA-Defence-Exhibition-Athens-M13661/Athens.html)

The DEFEA – Defence Exhibition Athens is a significant international event for the defense industry, held in Athens, Greece. This exhibition serves as a platform for showcasing advanced defense systems, technologies, and services. It brings together manufacturers, suppliers, and decision-makers from various countries, fostering collaboration and strategic partnerships within the global defense sector.

## Committees & topics

- Topics

  Military Aircraft: Modernization, Procurement, and Air Power Competition · Ammunition: Stockpiles, Production Capacity, and Export Controls · Military Communication Systems: Secure Networks and Battlefield Connectivity · Cyber Security Systems for Defense and Critical Infrastructure · Detection Systems: Radar, Sensors, and ISR Capabilities · National Security Systems: Integrated Defense and Homeland Resilience · Personal Equipment for Soldiers: Protection, Lethality, and Soldier Systems · Military Vehicles: Armor, Mobility, and Lessons from Contemporary Conflict

## Why it matters

This exhibition is crucial for understanding the evolving landscape of defense and security. It provides insights into emerging technologies, strategic priorities of different nations, and the direction of military modernization efforts. For countries like GRC, hosting such an event underscores its role as a regional hub for defense engagement and procurement.

The event facilitates direct interaction between defense industry leaders and government representatives, enabling discussions on critical security challenges and potential solutions. The presence of a diverse array of international participants highlights the interconnectedness of global security and the importance of multilateral cooperation in addressing complex threats. Observing the types of technologies and partnerships emphasized at DEFEA can offer valuable clues about future defense spending and strategic alliances.

## How to prepare

To effectively engage with the DEFEA exhibition, a thorough understanding of the current geopolitical climate and the specific defense needs of participating nations is essential. Prior research into the defense policies and procurement priorities of key countries, particularly those in the European region and the broader Mediterranean, will provide a strong foundation. Analyzing the historical defense relationships and recent military acquisitions of GRC, for instance, can offer context for the types of partnerships and technologies likely to be highlighted.

Delegates should prepare by identifying key exhibitors and their offerings, aligning them with their strategic interests. Understanding the nuances of defense procurement processes and international arms trade regulations will also be beneficial. Applying principles from the "[Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies)" lesson can help in navigating the exhibition's networking opportunities, while the "Dynamic Analysis" lesson can aid in interpreting the broader implications of the showcased technologies and discussions.

## Country perspectives

Where the most-relevant 4 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile.

[Greece](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece)

[Host nation, actively seeking to modernize its defense capabilities and strengthen regional security partnerships.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece)

[Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece)

[GRC hosts DEFEA, leveraging the event to showcase its defense industry, attract foreign investment, and explore advanced defense technologies for its armed forces. The exhibition is a key component of GRC's strategy to enhance its geopolitical standing and solidify its role as a security provider in the Eastern Mediterranean.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece)

[United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[Major defense exporter and strategic partner, interested in expanding market access and fostering alliances.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[The USA often participates with a strong presence, showcasing cutting-edge defense technologies and seeking to reinforce its strategic partnerships, particularly with NATO allies. Participation in DEFEA allows US defense contractors to explore new markets and collaborate on joint defense initiatives.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

[Significant European defense industry player, focused on promoting its advanced military systems and deepening bilateral defense ties.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

[Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

[FRA typically uses such exhibitions to highlight its advanced aerospace and naval defense capabilities. Its involvement at DEFEA is aimed at securing new contracts, strengthening its defense industrial base, and reinforcing its strategic relationship with GRC and other regional partners.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

[Türkiye](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

[Regional power with a growing domestic defense industry, potentially seeking technology transfers and export opportunities.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

[Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

[TUR's participation, if any, would likely focus on showcasing its indigenous defense products and exploring opportunities for technology acquisition or joint development. Given the complex relationship with GRC, any interactions would be closely observed for their diplomatic implications.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

## Topics & background

The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it.

1

### Military Aircraft: Modernization, Procurement, and Air Power Competition

Military aviation has been a defining instrument of state power since the First World War, and successive generations of combat aircraft have reshaped doctrine, alliance structures, and defense industrial bases. The Cold War institutionalized two parallel ecosystems — Western platforms led by U.S. and European manufacturers, and Soviet/Russian designs exported widely across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Since the 1990s, fifth-generation fighters (notably the F-22 and F-35), advanced unmanned aerial systems, and increasingly capable Chinese platforms such as the J-20 have intensified competition over air superiority and export markets. The core contemporary disputes concern technology transfer, interoperability within alliances such as NATO, and the rapid proliferation of armed drones — from the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 used in Ukraine and the Caucasus to Iranian Shahed loitering munitions. The war in Ukraine has revived European interest in fighter fleets, air defense, and standoff capabilities, while in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greek and Turkish acquisitions of Rafale, F-35, and Eurofighter aircraft have reframed the regional balance. Today, states are debating sixth-generation programs (GCAP, FCAS, NGAD), manned-unmanned teaming, and the regulation of armed drones under existing export control regimes such as the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Leading producer of fifth-generation fighters and dominant exporter through FMS channels.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

  [Manufacturer of the Rafale and co-leader of the European FCAS next-generation fighter program.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)
- [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)

  [Co-leader of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with Italy and Japan.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)
- [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

  [Rapidly expanding combat aviation industry, fielding J-20 and exporting J-10 and drones.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Legacy exporter of Su- and MiG-series aircraft, constrained by sanctions and Ukraine war losses.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [Turkey](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

  [Emerging drone exporter (Bayraktar) and developer of the indigenous KAAN fighter.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

2

### Ammunition: Stockpiles, Production Capacity, and Export Controls

Ammunition — from small-arms cartridges to large-caliber artillery shells and precision-guided munitions — has historically been treated as a logistics afterthought, but the war in Ukraine has revealed acute shortfalls in Western and Russian production capacity alike. By 2023, 155mm artillery shell consumption on the Ukrainian front routinely exceeded monthly output across NATO members combined, prompting the EU's Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and major U.S. investments to expand shell plants in Scranton and elsewhere. The core disputes involve burden-sharing among allies supplying Ukraine, the role of third-party suppliers such as South Korea and Pakistan, and allegations of North Korean and Iranian transfers to Russia in violation of UN sanctions. Small-arms ammunition flows also remain central to conflicts in Sudan, the Sahel, and Myanmar, where the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) aim to constrain illicit diversion. Today, the policy agenda spans surge production, common NATO calibers and standards, stockpile transparency, and tightening end-use monitoring to prevent diversion to non-state armed groups.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Largest producer and donor of artillery and precision munitions; expanding domestic shell production.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [High-volume consumer in Ukraine, reportedly importing shells from the DPRK.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)

  [Major artillery ammunition producer indirectly backfilling Western stockpiles.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)
- [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)

  [Leading European producer through Rheinmetall, expanding 155mm output across multiple plants.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)
- [North Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

  [Accused of transferring artillery shells and missiles to Russia in breach of UNSC sanctions.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)
- [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine)

  [Principal consumer of allied munitions and a test case for sustained high-intensity warfare.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine)

3

### Military Communication Systems: Secure Networks and Battlefield Connectivity

Modern military operations depend on resilient, encrypted communications spanning tactical radios, satellite links, and data-centric command networks. Since NATO's adoption of Link 16 and the U.S. push toward Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), the alliance has prioritized interoperability across services and partners. The war in Ukraine demonstrated both the vulnerabilities of legacy radio systems to electronic warfare and the transformative role of commercial satellite constellations such as Starlink in sustaining frontline communications. The core disputes concern reliance on commercial providers for sovereign military functions, spectrum allocation, and the security of supply chains for chips and cryptographic modules. Western states are also wrestling with the integration of 5G and software-defined radios, while Russia and China have invested heavily in electronic warfare systems designed to jam, spoof, or geolocate adversary emitters. Key policy debates today include sovereign satcom (notably the EU's IRIS² constellation), quantum-resistant encryption standards, and the governance of dual-use commercial networks during armed conflict.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Sets interoperability standards (Link 16, JADC2) and hosts dominant commercial satcom providers.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

  [Developing indigenous secure communications and satellite constellations to reduce Western dependence.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Heavy investor in electronic warfare and jamming systems targeting tactical communications.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

  [Driver of European sovereign satcom (Syracuse, IRIS²) and secure tactical radio exports.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)
- [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

  [Major exporter of tactical communications, software-defined radios, and EW countermeasures.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

4

### Cyber Security Systems for Defense and Critical Infrastructure

Cybersecurity has moved from a niche IT concern to a central pillar of national defense, formalized in NATO's recognition of cyberspace as an operational domain in 2016 and reinforced by repeated incidents — NotPetya (2017), SolarWinds (2020), Colonial Pipeline (2021), and sustained Russian cyber operations against Ukraine. UN processes, notably the Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs, have sought to codify norms of responsible state behavior, but enforcement remains weak and attribution contested. The core disputes pit advocates of a binding treaty (often led by Russia and supported by China) against Western states that favor applying existing international law and voluntary norms. States are simultaneously building offensive cyber capabilities, expanding intelligence-sharing through frameworks like Five Eyes, and hardening critical infrastructure in energy, finance, and healthcare. The rise of ransomware-as-a-service and state-tolerated criminal ecosystems has further blurred lines between criminal and state activity. Today's agenda focuses on supply chain security, zero-trust architectures, AI-enabled threat detection, and protection of undersea cables and space assets as critical infrastructure.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Operates the world's most capable offensive and defensive cyber forces through USCYBERCOM and CISA.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

  [Linked to extensive cyber-espionage campaigns; advocates sovereign cyberspace governance.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Conducts persistent offensive operations and pushes for a UN cybercrime convention on its terms.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

  [Leading exporter of cyber defense and surveillance technologies via firms such as Check Point and NSO.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)
- [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)

  [Hosts NCSC and pioneers public attribution and active cyber defense doctrine.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)
- [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia)

  [Hosts NATO CCDCOE and is a thought-leader on cyber norms following the 2007 attacks.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia)

5

### Detection Systems: Radar, Sensors, and ISR Capabilities

Detection systems — radar, electro-optical and infrared sensors, sonar, signals intelligence, and increasingly AI-driven fusion — underpin contemporary surveillance, missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Long-range early warning radars, AWACS aircraft, and space-based sensors have been central to deterrence since the Cold War, while the proliferation of cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and low-observable drones has driven demand for next-generation detection. Current debates center on integrated air and missile defense (notably NATO's European Sky Shield Initiative), counter-UAS systems following the experiences of Ukraine, Israel, and the Red Sea, and the militarization of commercial Earth-observation satellites. States are also confronting detection challenges posed by hypersonic weapons, which compress decision timelines, and by stealth aircraft and submarines. Key policy questions include export controls on advanced radar and sensor technologies under Wassenaar, data-sharing between allies, and the legality of persistent ISR over contested areas such as the South China Sea and the Black Sea.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Operator of the most advanced ISR architecture spanning space, air, and undersea sensors.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

  [Rapidly expanding radar and satellite ISR networks across the Indo-Pacific.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Fields long-range early warning radars and contests Western ISR in Ukraine via EW.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

  [Exporter of advanced radars (ELM/EL series) and counter-UAS sensors.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)
- [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

  [Producer of Thales radar and sensor families used across NATO and partner forces.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

6

### National Security Systems: Integrated Defense and Homeland Resilience

National security systems encompass the integrated architectures — command and control, border protection, counter-terrorism, intelligence fusion, and civil resilience — through which states defend against external and internal threats. The post-9/11 era saw rapid expansion of domestic security agencies and biometric border systems, while the 2014 and 2022 Russian aggressions against Ukraine reoriented European national security toward conventional deterrence and hybrid threats. The core disputes involve balancing civil liberties with surveillance authorities, the role of private contractors in core security functions, and integration of cyber, space, and information operations into traditional national defense planning. EU member states have advanced common frameworks via PESCO and the Strategic Compass, while NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept named Russia the most significant threat and identified China as a systemic challenge. Greece, as host of DEFEA, sits at the intersection of Eastern Mediterranean, Balkan, and migration-related security dynamics. Today's agenda includes critical infrastructure protection, counter-hybrid measures, secure 5G/6G deployment, and the resilience of supply chains for defense-critical materials.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Anchor of allied national security architectures and largest defense spender globally.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [Greece](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece)

  [Front-line NATO and EU state managing Eastern Mediterranean and migration-related security.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece)
- [Turkey](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

  [Major regional power with expanding indigenous defense industry and contested maritime claims.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)
- [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

  [Architect of EU strategic autonomy and a nuclear-armed pillar of European defense.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)
- [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)

  [Implementing the Zeitenwende defense overhaul to rebuild conventional capabilities.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)
- [Poland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland)

  [Fastest-growing NATO defense spender, reshaping the alliance's eastern posture.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland)

7

### Personal Equipment for Soldiers: Protection, Lethality, and Soldier Systems

Soldier systems — body armor, helmets, night-vision devices, individual weapons, load-carrying equipment, and increasingly wearable electronics — have evolved rapidly since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed gaps in IED protection and dismounted situational awareness. Programs such as the U.S. Next Generation Squad Weapon and Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS), and parallel European efforts like France's Scorpion and Germany's Infanterist der Zukunft, aim to integrate the individual soldier into networked combat formations. The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed the lethality of artillery, drones, and precision sniping, increasing demand for advanced body armor, counter-drone wearables, and electronic warfare-resistant communications at the squad level. At the same time, lessons from urban combat in Gaza and Mosul have driven investment in lightweight protective equipment and exoskeletons. Policy debates concern interoperability of equipment across allied forces, ethical questions around augmented-reality targeting aids, and ensuring that procurement keeps pace with rapidly evolving battlefield threats.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Sets benchmarks for soldier modernization through NGSW and IVAS programs.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

  [Runs the Scorpion program integrating soldier, vehicle, and network systems.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)
- [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)

  [Leads Infanterist der Zukunft and supplies allies via Heckler & Koch and Rheinmetall.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)
- [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

  [Combat-tested exporter of body armor, optics, and small arms accessories.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)
- [Greece](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece)

  [Modernizing its infantry equipment in line with NATO standards amid regional tensions.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece)

8

### Military Vehicles: Armor, Mobility, and Lessons from Contemporary Conflict

Military ground vehicles — main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and tactical wheeled platforms — remain central to land power despite recurring debates about their survivability. The war in Ukraine has been a stress test: Leopard 2, Challenger 2, Abrams, T-72, and T-90 tanks have all suffered losses to anti-tank guided missiles, drones, and mines, prompting renewed investment in active protection systems, top-attack countermeasures, and unmanned ground vehicles. European programs such as the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) and the U.S. Abrams X aim to define the next generation of armor, while exporters like South Korea (K2 Black Panther) and Turkey (Altay) are gaining market share. Light tactical vehicles such as JLTV and Bushmaster have proliferated across allied inventories, and unmanned/optionally-manned ground systems are entering early operational use. Key debates involve the future of heavy armor in a drone-saturated environment, sustainment burdens of mixed fleets supplied to Ukraine, and export controls on armored vehicles destined for conflict zones.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Producer of Abrams, Stryker, and JLTV families; shaping next-generation combat vehicle programs.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)

  [Leading European armor producer (Leopard 2, Puma) and co-leader of MGCS.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)
- [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

  [Co-leader of MGCS and producer of the Leclerc and Scorpion family vehicles.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Major tank producer whose fleet has been heavily attrited in Ukraine.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)

  [Fast-rising armor exporter via the K2 tank and K9 self-propelled howitzer.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)
- [Turkey](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

  [Developing the Altay MBT and exporting wheeled armored vehicles regionally.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

## Resources

News, lessons, and country profiles to prep for DEFEA – Defence Exhibition Athens 2027.

Recent reporting to ground your prep

[Virginia Joins National Popular Vote Compact](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/virginia-joins-national-popular-vote-compact-a-game-changer)

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Lessons

Bite-sized lessons to build the basics

[Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies)

[Hidden Stakeholders](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/hidden-stakeholders)

[Dynamic Analysis](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis)

[Stakeholder Mapping Workshop](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/stakeholder-workshop)

Courses

Guided courses that go deeper on the topic

[Media & Press Relations](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/media-press)

[Persuasion & Influence](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/persuasion)

[Cross-Cultural Communication](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/cross-cultural)

[Advanced Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/advanced-negotiation)

The states in play, with the data that shapes their stance

[Greece](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece)

[United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

[United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)

[China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

[Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

[Turkey](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey)

[South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)

[Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)

[North Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

[Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine)

[Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

[Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia)

[Poland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland)

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