--- title: "3rd Maritime Security Conference 2026 — Athens" description: "3rd Maritime Security Conference is a professional conference in Athens, Greece, Apr 28, 2026. Dates, deadlines, fees, and prep links." url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/conferences/professional/3rd-maritime-security-conference-2026" --- # 3rd Maritime Security Conference Apr 28, 2026[Athens, Greece](https://www.google.com/maps/search/?api=1\&query=Athens%2C%20Greece)In-person [Registration open](https://maritimegeopolitics.com/) The 3rd Maritime Security Conference, hosted in Athens, GRC, focuses on the critical and evolving landscape of maritime security. This event brings together experts and stakeholders to discuss pressing issues affecting global shipping lanes, naval operations, and economic stability. Given the strategic importance of maritime trade and geopolitical tensions in various sea regions, the conference serves as a vital platform for dialogue and collaboration. ## Committees & topics - Topics Chokepoints and Power Politics: Strategic Control over Critical Sea Routes · The Weaponisation of Shipping: Sanctions, Energy Security, and Economic Warfare at Sea · Technological Transformation of Shipping: AI, Nuclear Propulsion, Surveillance, and Cyber Risk · Operating in a Permanent Grey Zone: Managing Maritime Risk in an Unstable World · Greek Shipping in a Fragmented World: Strategy, Risk, and Emerging Opportunities ## Why it matters Maritime security is not merely a military concern; it is fundamental to global commerce, energy supply, and international relations. Disruptions in key waterways, whether from piracy, state-sponsored aggression, or environmental disasters, have far-reaching economic and political consequences. The conference's location in GRC, a nation with a significant maritime history and a large shipping fleet, underscores the practical relevance of these discussions. Understanding the multifaceted challenges in maritime security requires a nuanced approach, considering both traditional threats and emerging concerns such as cyber warfare targeting port infrastructure or autonomous vessel vulnerabilities. The discussions at this conference will likely explore how nations can collectively enhance surveillance, intelligence sharing, and rapid response capabilities to safeguard maritime interests. The insights gained are crucial for policymakers, industry leaders, and security professionals to develop robust strategies against an increasingly complex array of threats. ## How to prepare Delegates preparing for this conference should engage in a thorough stakeholder mapping exercise, considering the diverse interests of naval powers, shipping companies, insurance firms, and coastal states. Applying the principles of the "Power-Interest Grid" can help in identifying key actors and their potential influence on policy outcomes. Furthermore, understanding the "Hidden Stakeholders" in maritime security, such as local fishing communities or environmental groups, can provide a more comprehensive perspective on the challenges and potential solutions. Effective participation will also benefit from a "Dynamic Analysis" of current geopolitical flashpoints and their implications for maritime security, particularly in regions like the South [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Black Sea. Delegates should be prepared to discuss "Engagement Strategies" that foster international cooperation, rather than unilateral actions, to address common threats. Consideration of "Gender Dynamics Across Cultures" might also be relevant, particularly when discussing the human element of maritime operations and security personnel. ## Country perspectives Where the most-relevant 5 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile. [Greece](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [As a major shipping nation and host, GRC advocates for international cooperation in maritime security and the protection of commercial shipping lanes.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [GRC, with its extensive maritime tradition and strategic location, plays a crucial role in advocating for secure sea lanes in the Mediterranean and beyond. Its perspective often emphasizes the economic imperative of free navigation and the need for robust international frameworks to combat piracy and other threats.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [USA prioritizes freedom of navigation and countering state-sponsored maritime aggression, particularly in strategic waterways.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [The USA maintains a significant naval presence globally and is a key proponent of freedom of navigation operations. Its perspective often centers on deterring aggression, maintaining a rules-based international order at sea, and countering threats from actors like IRN and CHN.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [CHN emphasizes its sovereign rights in disputed waters and the protection of its growing maritime trade routes.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [CHN's rapidly expanding naval capabilities and economic interests make it a central player in maritime security discussions. Its perspective often involves asserting its claims in the South China Sea and protecting its Belt and Road Initiative maritime routes, which can sometimes lead to tensions with other nations.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [IRN focuses on its security interests in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, often in response to perceived external threats.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [IRN is a critical actor in the security of the Persian Gulf, a vital energy transit region. Its perspective is often shaped by regional rivalries and its strategic control over the Strait of Hormuz, leading to complex security dynamics.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [RUS seeks to project naval power and protect its access to global oceans, particularly through its northern and Black Sea fleets.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [RUS's maritime strategy involves maintaining its naval presence in key regions, including the Arctic and the Black Sea. Its perspective often highlights its sovereign rights and strategic interests in these areas, sometimes clashing with NATO members and other regional powers.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) ## Topics & background The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it. 1 ### Chokepoints and Power Politics: Strategic Control over Critical Sea Routes Roughly 80% of global trade by volume moves by sea, and a disproportionate share of it transits a handful of narrow chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, the Turkish Straits, the Malacca Strait, the Panama Canal, and the increasingly contested South China Sea. For three decades after the Cold War, the security of these routes was treated as a quasi-public good underwritten by the U.S. Navy and allied fleets. That assumption has eroded. China's naval modernization and island-building in the South China Sea, Russia's instrumentalization of the Black Sea and Northern Sea Route, Iran's harassment campaigns in the Gulf, and Houthi missile and drone attacks on Red Sea shipping since late 2023 have together returned maritime geopolitics to the centre of great-power competition. The core dispute is over who sets the rules at sea and who enforces them. UNCLOS provides the legal architecture — innocent passage, transit passage, freedom of navigation — but enforcement depends on naval presence and political will. The Red Sea crisis forced a large share of Asia–Europe container traffic around the Cape of Good Hope through 2024, raising freight rates and insurance premiums and exposing how a single non-state actor can reshape global logistics. Multinational responses (Operation Prosperity Guardian, the EU's Aspides mission) have contained but not resolved the threat, while drought-driven transit cuts at the Panama Canal have underlined that chokepoints are vulnerable to climate as well as conflict. Today the picture is one of fragmented deterrence: overlapping coalitions, divergent rules of engagement, and growing willingness by revisionist states and proxies to test freedom of navigation. The debate is whether the international community can restore a credible common framework for chokepoint security, or whether sea-lane control will increasingly follow bloc lines. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Principal guarantor of freedom of navigation through forward-deployed naval power](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Rising naval power contesting maritime order in the South China Sea and beyond](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Disruptor in the Strait of Hormuz and patron of Red Sea proxy actors](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Challenger in the Black Sea, Arctic, and via sanctions-evading shadow fleet](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [Egypt](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) [Sovereign of the Suez Canal, directly exposed to Red Sea disruption](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Lead European naval contributor to chokepoint coalitions](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) 2 ### The Weaponisation of Shipping: Sanctions, Energy Security, and Economic Warfare at Sea Shipping has become a primary battlefield of economic statecraft. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the G7 and EU imposed an oil price cap and sweeping sanctions on Russian energy exports, prompting the rapid expansion of a 'shadow fleet' of opaque-ownership tankers operating outside Western insurance and classification regimes. Estimates put this fleet at well over 600 vessels, moving sanctioned Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan crude through ship-to-ship transfers, flag-hopping, and AIS spoofing. Parallel U.S. and EU measures targeting Iranian oil and a tightening web of secondary sanctions have turned tanker ownership, insurance (notably the London-based P\&I clubs), and port-state control into instruments of foreign policy. The core disputes are layered. First, the legality and effectiveness of unilateral and coalition sanctions on shipping under international law, including UNCLOS rules on innocent passage and flag-state jurisdiction. Second, the safety and environmental risks of an aging, under-insured shadow fleet — incidents in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Gulf of Oman have already raised the spectre of major spills. Third, the use of cable-cutting, port sabotage, and tanker seizures as deniable tools of economic warfare, with incidents in the Baltic Sea attributed to vessels linked to Russia and China. Where things stand: enforcement is patchy, the shadow fleet continues to grow, and energy importers in Asia have largely declined to join Western caps. The G7 has tightened price-cap enforcement and sanctioned individual vessels and operators, but the structural shift toward a bifurcated maritime economy — one compliant, one parallel — appears durable. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Architect of the oil price cap and secondary sanctions regime](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Primary target and operator of the largest sanctions-evading shadow fleet](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Long-standing sanctions evader and source of dark-fleet tonnage](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Host of global marine insurance markets central to enforcement](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Major buyer of discounted sanctioned crude and provider of alternative financial rails](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Greece](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [World's largest shipowning nation, central to compliance and price-cap implementation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) 3 ### Technological Transformation of Shipping: AI, Nuclear Propulsion, Surveillance, and Cyber Risk Commercial shipping is undergoing its deepest technological shift since containerization. The IMO's 2023 revised GHG strategy targets net-zero emissions from international shipping by or around 2050, accelerating interest in alternative fuels (ammonia, methanol, hydrogen) and, increasingly, in small modular reactors and other forms of nuclear propulsion for merchant vessels — a concept being studied seriously by classification societies and several shipowners. Simultaneously, AI-enabled route optimization, autonomous and remotely operated vessels (MASS), and advanced satellite surveillance (including commercial SAR imagery used to track dark-fleet activity) are reshaping how ships are operated and policed. The accompanying risks are significant. Maritime cyber incidents have grown sharply since the 2017 NotPetya attack on Maersk, and ports, ECDIS navigation systems, and GNSS signals are now routine targets for jamming, spoofing, and ransomware. The IMO's 2021 cyber risk management guidelines remain non-binding, and regulatory capacity at flag-state level is uneven. Nuclear propulsion raises unresolved questions of port access, liability under conventions such as the 1962 Brussels Convention (never widely ratified), and non-proliferation safeguards. Autonomous vessels challenge the very definition of 'master' and 'seafarer' under SOLAS and STCW. The state of play is one of regulation lagging deployment. The IMO is working through a MASS Code targeted for adoption later this decade, while industry is moving ahead with pilots. Delegates face a system in which decarbonization mandates, security imperatives, and commercial competition are pushing technological change faster than international rules can absorb. Key players - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Host of the IMO and key voice on maritime regulation and cyber norms](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Leader in naval nuclear propulsion expertise and maritime cyber doctrine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Largest shipbuilder and a pacesetter in port automation and merchant nuclear concepts](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea) [Leading builder of advanced, low-carbon, and autonomous-ready tonnage](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea) - [Norway](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Pioneer of autonomous shipping pilots and green corridors](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) - [Japan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/japan) [Major flag and owner state advancing MASS trials and alternative fuels](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/japan) 4 ### Operating in a Permanent Grey Zone: Managing Maritime Risk in an Unstable World Maritime 'grey zone' activity — coercive behaviour below the threshold of armed conflict — has moved from periphery to norm. Examples include Chinese maritime militia and coast guard pressure on Philippine resupply missions at Second Thomas Shoal, suspected Russian and Chinese involvement in undersea cable and pipeline incidents in the Baltic (Nord Stream, Balticconnector, multiple telecom cables), Iranian tanker seizures in the Gulf, Houthi missile and USV attacks in the Red Sea, and persistent GNSS jamming across the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. These actions are designed to be deniable, to fall under insurance and legal grey areas, and to exhaust the response capacity of rules-based actors. The core challenge is that existing frameworks — UNCLOS, the SUA Convention, IMO safety regulations, and war-risk insurance clauses — were built for clearer categories of peace, war, and piracy. War-risk premiums in the Red Sea and Black Sea have spiked, JWC listed-area zones have expanded, and shipowners increasingly face decisions that mix commercial, legal, and quasi-military judgement. Crew welfare, including the plight of seafarers stranded in war zones or on detained vessels, has become an acute humanitarian concern flagged by the ILO and ICS. Where things stand: states and industry are improvising. Multinational task forces, expanded information-sharing through bodies like UKMTO and the IMB, private armed guards, and rerouting decisions are being layered onto a system that lacks a coherent doctrine for persistent low-intensity maritime coercion. The debate is whether grey-zone activity can be deterred within current law, or whether new norms — particularly around undersea infrastructure and coast guard behaviour — are required. Key players - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Principal practitioner of maritime grey-zone coercion in the South and East China Seas](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Suspected actor behind Baltic undersea infrastructure incidents and Black Sea disruption](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Conductor of tanker seizures and proxy attacks across Gulf and Red Sea waters](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) - [Philippines](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/philippines) [Frontline state resisting grey-zone pressure in the South China Sea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/philippines) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Lead organizer of multinational maritime security responses](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Operator of UKMTO and central node in commercial maritime threat reporting](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) 5 ### Greek Shipping in a Fragmented World: Strategy, Risk, and Emerging Opportunities Greek-owned shipping is the largest national fleet in the world, controlling roughly 20% of global deadweight tonnage and a dominant share of the world's crude tanker and dry bulk capacity. This position, built over decades of family-owned, globally deployed tonnage operating largely under foreign flags, makes Greek owners uniquely exposed to — and influential within — every major fault line of contemporary maritime affairs: Russian oil sanctions and the G7 price cap, Red Sea rerouting, IMO decarbonization, U.S.–China decoupling pressures, and the rise of shadow-fleet competition. The core strategic dispute facing Greek shipping is how to navigate fragmentation without losing access to either Western financial and insurance systems or Eastern cargo flows. Greek owners were the largest carriers of Russian crude before 2022; the price cap forced rapid restructuring, with some tonnage exiting the trade and other vessels sold into opaque ownership structures, drawing scrutiny from U.S. OFAC and the UK's OFSI. At the same time, Greek yards-orderbook activity in Korea, China, and Japan reflects a major fleet renewal cycle driven by IMO 2050 targets, with significant bets on dual-fuel LNG, methanol, and ammonia-ready vessels. Piraeus, majority-controlled by COSCO since 2016, illustrates the parallel question of how Greek maritime infrastructure fits into Chinese Belt and Road logistics. Where things stand: Greek shipping remains highly profitable but operates in an environment where commercial decisions are inseparable from geopolitical alignment. The debate is over how Greece — as an EU and NATO member hosting the world's leading shipowning community — can shape, rather than merely absorb, the rules emerging around sanctions enforcement, decarbonization, and chokepoint security. Key players - [Greece](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [Home state of the world's largest shipowning community](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Sets sanctions and price-cap rules that directly constrain Greek operators](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Key shipbuilder, cargo source, and operator of Piraeus port](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Historically major charterer of Greek tonnage, now a sanctioned counterparty](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Provider of insurance, finance, and legal services central to Greek fleet operations](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea) [Primary builder of advanced and alternative-fuel tonnage ordered by Greek owners](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea) ## Resources News, lessons, and country profiles to prep for 3rd Maritime Security Conference. Recent reporting to ground your prep [Rahul Gandhi Defends Tamil Nadu's Autonomy](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/rahul-gandhis-stand-against-131st-amendment-bill-in-tamil-nadu) [India's 131st Amendment Bill](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/indias-131st-amendment-bill-womens-reservation-for-2029-elections) [Supreme Court Upholds Election Commission Dis](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/supreme-court-keeps-election-commission-control-fight-alive) [West Bengal 2026 Election](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/west-bengal-2026-election-mamata-banerjees-toughest-challenge) Lessons Bite-sized lessons to build the basics [The Power-Interest Grid](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/power-interest-grid) [Hidden Stakeholders](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/hidden-stakeholders) [Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies) [Dynamic Analysis](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis) Courses Guided courses that go deeper on the topic [Stakeholder Mapping](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/stakeholder-mapping) [Advanced Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/advanced-negotiation) [Multilateral Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/multilateral-negotiation) [Policy Brief Writing](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/policy-brief) The states in play, with the data that shapes their stance [Greece](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Egypt](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea) [Norway](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/norway) [Japan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/japan) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/japan) [Philippines](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/philippines) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/philippines) ## Frequently asked questions - - Free account Save conferences, research any topic with AI, build position papers, and keep your daily prep streak — free. [Create free account](https://modeldiplomat.com/sign-up?next=%2Fconferences%2Fprofessional%2F3rd-maritime-security-conference-2026) Already a member? [Log in](https://modeldiplomat.com/sign-in?next=%2Fconferences%2Fprofessional%2F3rd-maritime-security-conference-2026) Free account Save conferences, research any topic with AI, build position papers, and keep your daily prep streak — free. [Create free account](https://modeldiplomat.com/sign-up?next=%2Fconferences%2Fprofessional%2F3rd-maritime-security-conference-2026) Already a member? [Log in](https://modeldiplomat.com/sign-in?next=%2Fconferences%2Fprofessional%2F3rd-maritime-security-conference-2026)