--- title: "APSACO 2026 — Rabat | Model Diplomat" description: "10th African Peace and Security Annual Conference (APSACO) 2026 is a professional conference in Rabat, Morocco, Jun 11, 2026." url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/conferences/professional/10th-african-peace-and-security-annual-conference-apsaco-2026" --- # 10th African Peace and Security Annual Conference (APSACO) 2026 Jun 11, 2026[Rabat, Morocco](https://www.google.com/maps/search/?api=1\&query=Rabat%2C%20Morocco)In-person [Registration open](https://barlamantoday.com/2026/06/11/apsaco-2026-opens-in-rabat-as-africa-reassesses-a-decade-of-security-crises/) The 10th African Peace and Security Annual Conference (APSACO) 2026 will convene in Rabat, MAR, bringing together stakeholders to critically reassess the trajectory of peace and security across the African continent over the past decade. This significant gathering aims to analyze the evolving nature of conflicts, the effectiveness of current security architectures, and the socio-economic factors influencing stability. The conference provides a crucial platform for dialogue among policymakers, academics, civil society representatives, and international partners. Participants will engage in discussions designed to identify gaps in existing strategies and to formulate forward-looking approaches to address persistent and emerging security threats, fostering a more stable and prosperous future for the region. ## Committees & topics - Topics African Security Challenges: A Continental Overview · Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa · The Resurgence of Coups d'État in Africa · Regional Conflicts and Cross-Border Wars · Great-Power Geopolitical Rivalries on the Continent · Peace Operations in Africa: From UN Missions to AU-Led Deployments · Political Instability and Governance Crises · Foreign Powers in African Security Affairs ## Why it matters The African continent has experienced a complex array of security challenges over the past decade, ranging from internal conflicts and political instability to the rise of extremist groups and the impacts of climate change. The 10th APSACO 2026 offers a timely opportunity to reflect on these developments and to evaluate the efficacy of various interventions and policies implemented by African nations and their partners. This conference is particularly important as it seeks to move beyond reactive measures, encouraging a proactive and holistic approach to peace and security. By examining the root causes of instability and exploring innovative solutions, the discussions in Rabat will contribute to shaping the continent's security agenda for the coming years. The outcomes are expected to influence regional cooperation frameworks and national strategies, ultimately aiming to enhance the resilience of African states against diverse threats. The insights generated from this gathering will be vital for understanding the intricate dynamics at play and for fostering collaborative efforts to build sustainable peace. It underscores the commitment of African leaders and the international community to address these pressing issues collectively, recognizing that peace and security are fundamental prerequisites for development and prosperity. ## How to prepare To effectively engage with the discussions at the 10th APSACO 2026, participants should familiarize themselves with the historical context of peace and security efforts in Africa, particularly over the last decade. Understanding the evolution of various conflicts and the responses to them will provide a strong foundation for contributing to the conference's objectives. Delegates should also prepare by researching the current geopolitical landscape of the continent, including the roles of key regional organizations and international actors. A comprehensive understanding of the diverse perspectives from different African sub-regions will be crucial for constructive dialogue. Additionally, reviewing successful case studies and lessons learned from past peacebuilding initiatives can inform contributions to policy recommendations. Consideration of the various stakeholders involved in peace and security processes, including governmental bodies, civil society organizations, and local communities, will enhance the ability to engage in nuanced discussions. Understanding the multifaceted nature of these challenges requires a broad perspective that incorporates political, economic, and social dimensions. ## Country perspectives Where the most-relevant 4 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile. [Morocco](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) [As the host nation, MAR is committed to facilitating discussions on peace and security, highlighting its role in regional stability and counter-terrorism efforts.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) [MAR plays a pivotal role in regional security, particularly in North Africa and the Sahel. Hosting the 10th APSACO 2026 underscores its commitment to fostering dialogue and cooperation on peace and security issues across the continent. MAR's experiences in counter-terrorism and regional stability initiatives will likely be central to discussions.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) [Ethiopia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) [ETH, as the seat of the African Union, is a key player in continental peace and security architecture, advocating for African-led solutions.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) [As the host country of the African Union, ETH is central to the continent's peace and security architecture. Its perspective will be crucial in discussions about strengthening regional mechanisms and implementing African-led solutions to conflicts. ETH's experiences with internal and regional security challenges provide valuable insights.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) [Nigeria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [NGA, a major economic and military power, is deeply invested in regional stability, particularly in West Africa, and combating extremism.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [NGA, as a significant economic and military power in West Africa, has a strong interest in regional stability and combating extremist groups. Its contributions will likely focus on strategies for counter-terrorism, regional security cooperation, and addressing the root causes of instability in its sub-region.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [South Africa](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [ZAF advocates for multilateralism and peaceful resolution of conflicts, often emphasizing socio-economic development as a foundation for lasting peace.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [ZAF is a prominent voice for multilateralism and peaceful conflict resolution on the continent. Its perspective often emphasizes the importance of socio-economic development and good governance as foundational elements for sustainable peace and security. ZAF's experience in post-conflict reconstruction and democratic transitions will be relevant.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) ## Topics & background The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it. 1 ### African Security Challenges: A Continental Overview Africa's security landscape has grown markedly more complex since the end of the Cold War, evolving from primarily inter-state and liberation-era conflicts toward a dense web of intra-state wars, insurgencies, transnational crime, and climate-driven instability. The African Union's adoption of the Constitutive Act in 2000 and the launch of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2002 reflected a continental ambition to address these threats collectively, including through the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, and the African Standby Force. Yet implementation has lagged, and the AU's 'Silencing the Guns by 2020' initiative was extended to 2030 after failing to meet its initial targets. Today, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Lake Chad Basin, the Great Lakes, and parts of Southern Africa (notably Cabo Delgado in Mozambique) host overlapping crises. Drivers include weak state penetration in peripheral regions, contested elections, demographic pressure, illicit economies in gold and narcotics, and the spillover of jihadist networks. The convergence of climate stress, food insecurity, and forced displacement — Africa hosts more than 40 million displaced persons — compounds these dynamics and strains both national militaries and regional bodies such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC. The central debate is whether African-led solutions can be adequately financed and operationalized, particularly after UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) opened a pathway to assessed contributions for AU-led peace support operations. Questions of sovereignty, subsidiarity between the AU and Regional Economic Communities, and the appropriate balance between kinetic and developmental responses remain unresolved. Key players - [Ethiopia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) [Host of the AU and a major troop contributor whose own internal conflicts shape continental credibility.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) - [Nigeria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [West Africa's security anchor and lead in the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram and ISWAP.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) - [South Africa](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [SADC heavyweight and key voice on AU reform, peace operations financing, and Mozambique deployment.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) - [Kenya](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/kenya) [Horn of Africa security broker, troop contributor in Somalia and the DRC, and proponent of regional initiatives.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/kenya) - [Egypt](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) [Influential in AU peace and security architecture, Nile basin security, and Sahel-Maghreb stability.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) - [Morocco](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) [Active in AU mediation since its 2017 readmission and a hub for counter-terrorism cooperation.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) 2 ### Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa Africa has become the global epicenter of jihadist violence, according to successive Global Terrorism Index reports, with the Sahel alone accounting for over half of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in recent years. The trajectory began with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) consolidating in the Sahara in the mid-2000s, the rise of Boko Haram around Lake Chad from 2009, and al-Shabaab's expansion in Somalia after the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. The 2012 Libyan state collapse flooded the region with weapons and fighters, accelerating the spread of armed groups across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, while the Islamic State established affiliates from the Sahel to Mozambique and the eastern DRC (ADF/ISCAP). Counter-terrorism responses have varied. The G5 Sahel Joint Force, France's Operation Barkhane, the EU training missions, AMISOM/ATMIS in Somalia, the MNJTF around Lake Chad, and SADC's SAMIM in Mozambique each produced uneven results. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali (2022), Burkina Faso (2023), and Niger (2023), the dissolution of the G5 Sahel in 2023, and the troubled drawdown of ATMIS in Somalia have created operational vacuums increasingly filled by Russian paramilitary actors and by new sub-regional arrangements such as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Debates now center on whether militarized counter-terrorism has produced diminishing returns, how to address grievances rooted in governance and identity politics, and how to handle the question of dialogue with armed groups. Financing of counter-terrorism, regional intelligence sharing through mechanisms like the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes, and the protection of civilians during operations remain unresolved. Key players - [Mali](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mali) [Epicenter of Sahelian jihadism and lead state in the Alliance of Sahel States after exiting ECOWAS.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mali) - [Burkina Faso](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/burkina-faso) [Now the country with the highest terrorism-related death toll globally; junta-led and AES member.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/burkina-faso) - [Niger](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/niger) [Former Western counter-terror hub now realigned with Mali and Burkina Faso under the AES.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/niger) - [Nigeria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [Frontline state against Boko Haram and ISWAP and lead of the MNJTF.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) - [Somalia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/somalia) [Battleground against al-Shabaab and host of ATMIS's transition to Somali-led security.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/somalia) - [Mozambique](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mozambique) [Site of the ISIS-linked Cabo Delgado insurgency and recipient of SADC and Rwandan support.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mozambique) 3 ### The Resurgence of Coups d'État in Africa After two decades of decline, unconstitutional changes of government have returned with striking frequency in Africa. Since 2020, successful coups have occurred in Mali (2020, 2021), Chad (2021, dynastic succession), Guinea (2021), Sudan (2021), Burkina Faso (twice in 2022), Niger (2023), and Gabon (2023), alongside several failed attempts. This 'coup belt' stretching across the Sahel and into Central Africa marks the sharpest reversal of Africa's post-Cold War democratization trend and has tested the AU's 2000 Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007), which prohibit unconstitutional changes of government. Drivers vary by case but share recurring features: insecurity and military frustration with civilian leadership (notably in the Sahel), elite manipulation of term limits and contested elections, economic grievances, and growing anti-French sentiment that juntas have leveraged for legitimacy. The AU and ECOWAS suspended several states and imposed sanctions, but ECOWAS's threat of military intervention in Niger in 2023 failed to materialize and instead accelerated the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States and the announced withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from ECOWAS in 2024. The debate now concerns the credibility of regional anti-coup norms, the conditions for re-engagement with transitional authorities, the design of realistic transition timelines, and whether external partners — Western, Russian, Gulf, and Chinese — are inadvertently rewarding or punishing coup-makers through their engagement choices. Key players - [Nigeria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [Chair of ECOWAS during the Niger crisis and central to regional norm enforcement.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) - [Niger](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/niger) [Site of the 2023 coup that triggered ECOWAS confrontation and the AES realignment.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/niger) - [Mali](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mali) [Pioneer of the recent coup wave and architect of the AES bloc rejecting ECOWAS oversight.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mali) - [Gabon](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/gabon) [Atypical 2023 coup ousting a long-ruling dynasty in Central Africa.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/gabon) - [Chad](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/chad) [Case of dynastic military succession tolerated by external partners, complicating AU norms.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/chad) - [Sudan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sudan) [October 2021 coup that derailed civilian transition and helped precipitate the current war.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sudan) 4 ### Regional Conflicts and Cross-Border Wars Africa's most destructive contemporary conflicts are increasingly regional rather than purely national. Sudan's war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which erupted in April 2023, has produced the world's largest displacement crisis with over 10 million people uprooted and has drawn in external sponsors, with consequences cascading into Chad, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the M23 rebellion — which the UN Group of Experts has documented as receiving support from Rwanda — has reignited a Great Lakes crisis recalling the wars of the 1990s, with Burundi, Uganda, and SADC forces all involved. Elsewhere, the Tigray war (2020–2022) left lingering tensions in northern Ethiopia and unresolved Amhara and Oromia insurgencies; Cameroon's Anglophone crisis continues; and the Horn faces fresh strain from Ethiopia's 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland on sea access, which Somalia has rejected as a violation of its sovereignty. Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and renewed Houthi-driven disruption in the Red Sea further entangle African states in wider conflict systems. At issue is whether existing mechanisms — IGAD on Sudan and the Horn, the East African Community and SADC on the DRC, the AU Peace and Security Council overall — can mediate effectively when regional powers are themselves parties to the conflicts. Questions of arms embargo enforcement (UNSC Resolution 1591 on Sudan), accountability for atrocities, and humanitarian access dominate the agenda. Key players - [Sudan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sudan) [Site of the SAF–RSF war and the continent's largest current humanitarian catastrophe.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sudan) - [Democratic Republic of the Congo](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/drc) [Eastern DRC remains the locus of the Great Lakes conflict system.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/drc) - [Rwanda](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/rwanda) [Accused by the UN of backing M23 and central to any Great Lakes settlement.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/rwanda) - [Ethiopia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) [Recovering from Tigray war while pursuing contested Red Sea access via Somaliland.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) - [Somalia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/somalia) [Confronts al-Shabaab, ATMIS transition, and the Ethiopia–Somaliland MoU dispute.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/somalia) - [Chad](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/chad) [Hosts massive Sudanese refugee flows and is implicated in arms transfers to Darfur.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/chad) 5 ### Great-Power Geopolitical Rivalries on the Continent Africa has re-emerged as a theater of great-power competition, with overlapping rivalries between the United States, China, Russia, the European Union, and increasingly Gulf states, Turkey, and India. China's footprint, built since the 2000 launch of FOCAC, combines infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative with a growing security presence, including its first overseas base in Djibouti (2017) and expanded arms sales. The United States, through AFRICOM (established 2007), the 2022 US–Africa Leaders Summit, and partnership initiatives like Lobito Corridor financing, has sought to reframe its engagement around critical minerals, infrastructure, and counter-terrorism. Russia has expanded influence via diplomatic outreach (the 2019 and 2023 Russia–Africa Summits), arms transfers, and the deployment of the Wagner Group — now reorganized as Africa Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense — in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Central African Republic, and Libya. The Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are deeply engaged in the Horn and Sudan through ports, agriculture, and weapons flows, while Turkey has become a major drone supplier and Türkiye-mediated agreements have shaped both Somali and Ethiopian–Somali diplomacy. For African states, the debate is how to leverage this competition for development gains without being drawn into proxy dynamics, how to preserve strategic autonomy and AU centrality, and how to navigate sanctions regimes and critical-minerals competition that increasingly condition diplomatic relationships. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Pursuing counter-terrorism partnerships, critical minerals access, and a counter to Chinese and Russian influence.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Largest bilateral trading partner and growing security actor anchored at Djibouti.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Expanding political-military footprint via Africa Corps and arms diplomacy, especially in the Sahel.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Former dominant security partner now in strategic retreat from the Sahel.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [United Arab Emirates](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) [Major Gulf investor and security broker in the Horn and Sudan.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) - [Turkey](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) [Rising defense exporter and mediator with bases and drones across the continent.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) 6 ### Peace Operations in Africa: From UN Missions to AU-Led Deployments Africa hosts the majority of UN peacekeepers and almost all of the AU's peace support operations, but the model is in profound transition. The closure of MINUSMA in Mali (2023) at the host government's request, the drawdown of MONUSCO in the DRC (begun in 2024), and the planned transition of ATMIS in Somalia signal the end of an era of large multidimensional UN missions on the continent. Host-state pushback, frustration with mandates focused on civilian protection without robust counter-insurgency authority, and the rise of sovereigntist narratives have all eroded the political space for traditional peacekeeping. In parallel, the AU and Regional Economic Communities have taken on heavier kinetic roles — AMISOM/ATMIS in Somalia, MNJTF around Lake Chad, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (now defunct), SAMIM in Mozambique, the EAC Regional Force and SAMIDRC in eastern DRC. UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (December 2023) created, for the first time, a framework allowing AU-led peace support operations to access UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis, addressing a long-standing financing gap, though questions of mandate authority, human rights compliance, and burden-sharing remain. Key debates include how to design 'next-generation' missions suited to counter-terrorism and stabilization environments, how to ensure predictable financing under 2719, how to integrate women and civilian protection mandates, and how to manage transitions from international missions to national forces without creating security vacuums. Key players - [Ethiopia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) [Major troop contributor and host of the AU's peace and security architecture.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) - [Rwanda](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/rwanda) [Top global troop contributor and bilateral deployer in Mozambique and CAR.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/rwanda) - [Uganda](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/uganda) [Long-standing backbone of AMISOM/ATMIS in Somalia.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/uganda) - [South Africa](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [Lead of SAMIDRC in the DRC and key voice on AU peace operations doctrine.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) - [Nigeria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [MNJTF lead and ECOWAS stabilization actor.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Decisive vote on UNSC mandates and key financier shaping Resolution 2719 implementation.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) 7 ### Political Instability and Governance Crises Political instability in Africa today manifests not only in coups but in contested elections, constitutional manipulation to extend presidential terms, urban protest movements, and governance vacuums in peripheral regions. V-Dem and Freedom House have recorded a sustained democratic regression across much of the continent since the mid-2010s, with notable exceptions in Zambia, Malawi, and Senegal where transitions of power have proceeded peacefully. Contested elections in countries such as Kenya (2022), Zimbabwe (2023), the DRC (2023), Mozambique (2024), and various 2024–2025 polls have repeatedly tested institutional resilience. Underlying drivers include the demographic pressure of Africa's youth bulge, with limited employment absorption; rising debt distress, with several countries restructuring under the G20 Common Framework; the corrosive effect of illicit financial flows; and the manipulation of identity politics. Disinformation, often amplified by foreign actors, has further polarized political environments. Civic space has narrowed in many states, even as protest movements — from Sudan's pro-democracy uprising to Kenya's 2024 Gen Z protests — show enduring popular demand for accountability. The core questions concern how regional and continental bodies can credibly defend constitutional order without appearing to defend incumbents; how to support electoral integrity and civic space; and how to address the structural economic and demographic conditions that make instability recurrent. Key players - [Nigeria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [Africa's largest democracy facing security, fiscal, and legitimacy pressures.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) - [Kenya](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/kenya) [Bellwether for civic mobilization and constitutional resilience in East Africa.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/kenya) - [South Africa](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [Coalition politics after the 2024 election test the durability of its post-apartheid order.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) - [Senegal](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/senegal) [2024 transition demonstrated democratic resilience amid prior constitutional crisis.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/senegal) - [Ethiopia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) [Post-Tigray reconstruction and ethnic federalism tensions shape Horn stability.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) - [Democratic Republic of the Congo](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/drc) [Contested 2023 elections and eastern insecurity exemplify governance under stress.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/drc) 8 ### Foreign Powers in African Security Affairs Foreign military and security engagement in Africa has diversified rapidly. France's Sahel posture, anchored by Operations Serval (2013) and Barkhane (2014–2022), has collapsed following expulsions from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Senegal between 2022 and 2024. The United States lost its Niger drone bases at Agadez in 2024 and has consolidated counter-terrorism activities in Djibouti and selected partners. China maintains its Djibouti base and is expanding security cooperation, training, and arms exports while remaining cautious about overt combat roles. Russia, through Africa Corps, has stepped into vacuums left by Western forces, particularly in the Sahel and CAR, providing regime protection in exchange for resource concessions and political alignment. Gulf states have become consequential security actors: the UAE and Saudi Arabia compete for influence on the Red Sea littoral and are implicated in the Sudanese conflict through alleged support to opposing parties. Turkey has become a leading drone supplier and signed defense agreements from Somalia to Niger, while Iran is rebuilding ties through arms transfers. India and Japan, through the Indo-Pacific framing and TICAD respectively, are seeking expanded but largely non-kinetic roles. The EU has pivoted toward training missions, the European Peace Facility, and migration-linked security cooperation. The central question for African states and the AU is how to set the terms of foreign engagement — under the AU's 2022 Common African Defence and Security Policy review and the principle of African ownership — rather than be the object of competing strategies. Debates focus on basing rights, mercenary regulation under the 1977 OAU Convention, arms embargo compliance, and conditionalities attached to military assistance. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Former lead Western security partner in francophone Africa, now largely expelled from the Sahel.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Reorienting from forward Sahel deployments to selective counter-terrorism partnerships.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Principal beneficiary of Western retrenchment via Africa Corps deployments.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Expanding security cooperation alongside dominant economic presence.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [United Arab Emirates](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) [Major Gulf actor shaping Sudan, the Horn, and Red Sea security.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) - [Turkey](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) [Rising defense supplier and base-holder, notably in Somalia and Libya.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) ## Resources News, lessons, and country profiles to prep for 10th African Peace and Security Annual Conference (APSACO) 2026. Recent reporting to ground your prep [West Bengal Voter Deletion Crisis 2026](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/west-bengal-voter-deletion-crisis-ahead-of-2026-assembly-elections) [West Bengal Voter Deletion Crisis](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/west-bengal-voter-deletion-crisis-27-million-affected-ahead-of-polls) [Delimitation Based on 2011 Census](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/delimitation-based-on-2011-census-indias-political-shift) [Supreme Court Upholds Election Commission Dis](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/supreme-court-keeps-election-commission-control-fight-alive) Lessons Bite-sized lessons to build the basics [Hidden Stakeholders](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/hidden-stakeholders) [Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies) [Dynamic Analysis](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis) [Stakeholder Mapping Workshop](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/stakeholder-workshop) Courses Guided courses that go deeper on the topic [Advanced Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/advanced-negotiation) [Multilateral Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/multilateral-negotiation) [Policy Brief Writing](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/policy-brief) [Conflict Resolution](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/conflict-resolution) The states in play, with the data that shapes their stance [Morocco](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) [Ethiopia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ethiopia) [Nigeria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria) [South Africa](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [Kenya](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/kenya) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/kenya) [Egypt](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) [Mali](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mali) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mali) [Burkina Faso](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/burkina-faso) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/burkina-faso) [Niger](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/niger) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/niger) [Somalia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/somalia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/somalia) [Mozambique](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mozambique) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mozambique) [Gabon](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/gabon) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/gabon) [Chad](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/chad) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/chad) [Sudan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sudan) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sudan) [Democratic Republic of the Congo](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/drc) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/drc) [Rwanda](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/rwanda) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/rwanda) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [United Arab Emirates](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) [Turkey](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) [Uganda](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/uganda) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/uganda) [Senegal](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/senegal) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/senegal) ## Frequently asked questions - - Free account Save conferences, research any topic with AI, build position papers, and keep your daily prep streak — free. 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